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UNTRUSTWORTHY: ERISA’S ERODED FIDUCIARY LAW†

PETER J. WIEDENBECK*
ABSTRACT
The trust law analogy has come to dominate judicial thinking
about employee benefit plans. Yet despite its rise to rhetorical prominence, ERISA fiduciary law has been dramatically transformed by
a series of uncoordinated, low-visibility judicial decisions on
multiple fronts. These apparently unconnected case law developments reveal a startling pattern of mutually reinforcing restrictions
on ERISA’s protection of pension and welfare benefits. This study
chronicles ERISA’s trust law turn to expose how untrustworthy
workers’ benefit safeguards have become. Both the scope and the intensity of fiduciary oversight have been radically pruned back in the
courts. Notwithstanding the congressional declaration that attempts
to relax workers’ federal fiduciary protections “shall be void as
against public policy,” the Supreme Court has shown the way to curtail fiduciary obligations. That de facto or implicit exculpation, combined with unilateral employer control over both plan terms and
plan interpretation, indicate that the federal courts have defanged—
or deranged—ERISA’s fiduciary regime. Despite their importance
to personal financial security and overall economic welfare, workers
repeatedly discover the fragility of the interests they earn under
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employer-sponsored health insurance and retirement savings programs. The new property in employee benefits is, along multiple
dimensions, remarkably weak property.
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INTRODUCTION
ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,1
is often hailed as a landmark achievement in labor and social
welfare legislation.2 Congress declared as its central goal “to protect
... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries.”3 One prominent strategy to that end was the imposition of broadly applicable, stringent federal fiduciary standards.
This trust law aspect of ERISA rapidly rose to doctrinal and rhetorical prominence, even as the force of ERISA fiduciary law slowly
corroded.
The scope and force of fiduciary principles in the employee benefit
context is an area of continuing controversy and a focus of ongoing
scholarly debate.4 Originally viewed as a fearsome threat to longstanding business practices, most of the details of ERISA’s fiduciary
regime were left to be worked out by the federal courts in civil enforcement actions. Distinguished scholars advocated flexibility in
the application of ERISA’s fiduciary duties, allowing courts to take
account of the sponsoring employer’s interests in employee benefit
programs to maximize the joint welfare of the employer and covered
employees.5 Federal courts did not follow that path. Instead, they
developed an alternative restraint: categorically excluding plan design decisions (adoption, amendment, or termination of a plan—socalled “settlor functions”) from the definition of fiduciary actions.

1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). In conformity with the common practice among employee benefit law
specialists, citations to specific provisions of ERISA point to the section numbers of the
original statute followed by a parallel citation to the location of the provisions in the U.S.
Code.
2. E.g., JAMES A. WOOTEN , THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974,
at 1 (2004) (describing ERISA as “landmark legislation” and quoting Senator Jacob Javits
calling ERISA “the greatest development in the life of the American worker since social
security”); Norman P. Stein & James A. Wooten, Foreword, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 257, 257 (2014)
(calling ERISA “arguably the last major piece of social legislation” of the twentieth century).
3. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part I.A.
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This settlor/fiduciary distinction, or settlor function doctrine, is now
widely recognized as a central tenet of employee benefit law.6
This Article relates the settlor function doctrine to ERISA’s accrued benefit anti-reduction rule, and shows that many troubling
results produced by the settlor function doctrine can be understood
as staking out the boundaries of a worker’s limited “property” interest in employee benefits. That property interest has two dimensions:
breadth and depth. The settlor function doctrine, by restricting the
range of application of ERISA’s fiduciary regime, limits the breadth
of property. The thesis of this Article is that case law developments
have also covertly limited the intensity or strictness of ERISA
fiduciary duties within their limited domain of application.7
Property in employee benefits is weak property.
The weaknesses of pension and welfare benefit property are
traceable to several sources in addition to the settlor function doctrine and ERISA’s minimal restraints on plan amendment. Employee benefit plans that the employer unilaterally establishes are
interpreted to carry out the employer’s intent.8 Plans that are
collectively bargained, in contrast, are read in light of contract
norms, but the Supreme Court’s guidance on plan interpretation
skews the inquiry to favor the employer.9 These interpretive doctrines sometimes operate to retrospectively curb or redefine employees’ interests in benefits.
The courts apply the limited abuse-of-discretion standard of review to fiduciary decisions if the plan grants the fiduciary discretion to construe its terms, as virtually all plans now do.10 Even if the
fiduciary is a company insider acting under a conflict of interest, her
decisions are accorded considerable deference—effectively given a
presumption of good faith and regularity. The practical result is a
species of implicit exculpation of employer-regarding decisions,
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text. Pursuant to the settlor function doctrine, a plan may be amended to confer discretionary authority to interpret its terms, thereby
relaxing judicial oversight of fiduciary decisions, without the amendment itself being subject
to any duties of loyalty or care to plan participants or beneficiaries. See infra Part I.B. Put
another way, the settlor function doctrine allows a plan sponsor to adopt, immune from
fiduciary exposure, plan terms that will reduce fiduciary exposure.
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notwithstanding ERISA’s express override of plan provisions that
would relax fiduciary obligations. This crypto-exculpation teaches
that the new property in employee benefits is weak property, both
because it is narrowly defined and loosely enforced.11
The emergence of weak property in employee benefits—the quiet
coup in ERISA fiduciary law—rebalances competing legislative
policies. It accords greater weight to employer autonomy and the
related desire to promote voluntary plan sponsorship, and increases
the vulnerability of employees’ anticipated health and retirement
benefits. Without undertaking to identify the optimal trade-off, this
Article briefly addresses the mechanisms by which workers’ interest in pension and welfare benefits could be reinforced.12 Whether
or not such a strengthening is pursued, the essential fragility of
purportedly robust federal protections is labor’s vital lesson.
I. TAMING ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW
Comprehensive private pension reform legislation underwent a
decade-long gestation.13 Strict federal fiduciary obligations applicable to both pension and welfare plans became an early component
of the package.14 Support for enhanced fiduciary oversight was

11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. See S. SPECIAL COMM . ON AGING , 98TH CONG ., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 6-25 (Comm. Print 1984) (prepared by Michael S.
Gordon); WOOTEN , supra note 2, at 116-18, 269-70.
14. See S. REP. NO. 89-1348, at 38-39 (1966); 116 CONG . REC. 7566-70 (1970) (statement
of Rep. Ayres) (explaining the 1970 Employee Benefits Protection Act, the Nixon Administration proposal); 113 CONG . REC. 3924-25 (1967) (explaining the Welfare and Pension Plan
Protection Act of 1967, the Johnson Administration proposal); WOOTEN, supra note 2, at 11718, 122 (reporting that the fiduciary responsibility recommendations stemmed from findings
by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator McClellan, that
several million dollars had been diverted from two local unions’ welfare funds).
The McClellan Committee revelations triggered a rapid turnaround in attitudes on this
issue. In January 1965, a Cabinet-level committee on private pensions had released a report
that did not recommend adoption of federal fiduciary standards. PRESIDENT’S COMM . ON CORP.
PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, at xv (1965) (“On the basis
of present evidence, the Committee does not propose the substitution of a new set of statutory
standards for the recognized [state law] standards of fiducial responsibility, although there
appears to be a need for strengthening statutory provisions for assuring compliance with
these standards.”).
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widespread,15 including among business groups and their representatives.16 Once ERISA emerged from the legislative arena,
however, the broad scope and apparently unyielding force of the
responsibilities imposed on benefit plan administrators aroused
concern. Congress, it seemed, had crafted an alarmingly strict and
expansive version of trust law that threatened to unbalance
ordinary operations of employee benefit plans.17 Benefit specialists
15. See Panel 1, Setting the Stage: History Before the Ninety-Third Congress, 6 DREXEL L.
REV. 265, 280-81 (2014) (remarks of Henry Rose) (suggesting the fiduciary responsibility
provisions were noncontroversial and largely unchanged after 1970); Panel 4, ERISA and the
Fiduciary, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 359, 360-62, 374-75 (2014) (remarks of Frank Cummings, Robert
Nagle, and Henry Rose) (describing fiduciary provisions as noncontroversial and subject to
little pressure to change).
16. Opponents of substantive pension regulation (including minimum standards governing
vesting, funding, and termination insurance) sought separate consideration of fiduciary
standards and enhanced disclosure. See Panel 1, supra note 15, at 281-82 (remarks of Frank
Cummings) (describing strategy of pension reform opponents). Passage of fiduciary and
disclosure rules was expected to delay consideration and weaken support for a broad overhaul
of private pension plans. “If you do these fiduciary standards, that will fix all the problems.
You don’t have to worry about funding, vesting, plan termination insurance ... all you gotta
do is catch the crooks and thieves.” Panel 4, supra note 15, at 376 (remarks of Frank
Cummings) (characterizing employer opinions on fiduciary standards). This strategy—advocating prompt passage of fiduciary standards but further study of controversial issues
(vesting, funding, termination insurance, and pension portability)—was initially followed by
the Nixon Administration. See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on
H.R. 1045, H.R. 1046, and H.R. 16462 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm.
on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong. 463-65 (1970) (statement of George P. Shultz, Secretary of
Labor); see also WOOTEN , supra note 2, at 127-128, 152-53, 158 (suggesting that a focus on
misconduct by plan administrators threatened to derail comprehensive pension reform).
17. See, e.g., Pension Reform’s Expensive Ricochet, BUS. WK ., Mar. 24, 1975, at 144, 144
(“Fiduciary rules are shaping up as the most controversial part of the new law.... [P]ension
administrators and investment managers are scrambling to protect themselves against
lawsuits.”); James C. Hyatt & Kenneth H. Bacon, Pension Tension: New Law Regulating
Retirement Benefits Is Full of Likely Problems for Fiduciaries, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1975, at
28, 28; Edmund Faltermayer, A Steeper Climb up Pension Mountain, FORTUNE, Jan. 1975, at
78, 162 (concluding that ERISA fiduciary duties have “clearly increased the legal liabilities
of anyone concerned with managing pension funds”); Alvin D. Lurie, IRS Assistant Comm’r
for Emp. Plans and Exempt Orgs., Address on Prohibited Transactions Before the ABA
National Institute on Fiduciary Responsibility, in Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at R-3 (June 16,
1975) (“To put it plainly, the new [prohibited transaction] rules have scared the daylights out
of everyone caught in their net.”); Plan Administration: Pension Law Inhibits New or
Continued Qualified Plans, Attorney Says, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at A-4 (Oct. 28, 1974)
(“[T]he provisions in the pension reform law that seem to be creating the greatest consternation among employers, especially among small companies, are the new rules on fiduciary
responsibility. The absolute restrictions on many types of transactions, such as sales and
loans between an employer and a plan, are viewed with alarm by employers.”); PENSION TASK
FORCE OF THE SUBCOMM . ON LABOR STANDARDS, H. COMM . ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 94TH CONG .,
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complained of “overkill” and looked for ways to rein in potentially
far-reaching and disruptive applications of ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility regime.18
ERISA’s fiduciary rules were derived from traditional trust law,
modified to adapt it to the mission of controlling mismanagement
and abuse of employee benefit programs.19 A trustee may be subject
ERISA OVERSIGHT REP. 3 (Comm. Print 1977) (“In the course of our oversight activities we
have been inundated with testimony and comments about the fiduciary standards provisions
of the Act and their implementation.”); Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 78, at A-10 (Mar. 22, 1976) (“The
basic problem with ERISA noted by most speakers [at the Eleventh Annual Mutual Funds
and Investment Management Conference] is its failure to adequately define fiduciary, party
in interest, and prohibited transactions. Panelists indicated that if the terms are literally
construed, the Act could paralyze those even remotely connected with pension funds.”); Panel
4, supra note 15, at 376-77 (comments of Karin Feldman) (suggesting that once ERISA
became law, everyone was worried about being a fiduciary).
18. John N. Erlenborn, Pension Reform: The Next Step, Address Before the Society of
Actuaries (1975), in 1 REC. SOC’Y ACTUARIES 465, 466 (1975) (influential Republican
congressman who had been a leading member of the ERISA Conference Committee complains
that “[t]his prohibited transactions section, it seems to me, is a clear case of legislative
overkill”); Walter S. Rothschild, Fiduciary Responsibilities, in PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING
PLANS, ser. D, fol. 2, at 3 (David C. Rothman ed., 1979) (“The objectives are laudatory, and
probably a majority of responsible and informed people agree that change was called for.
Many believe, however, that the complex, highly articulated regulatory web of ERISA’s
fiduciary responsibility provisions represent legislative overkill.”); Oversight of ERISA, 1977:
Hearings on S. 2125 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th
Cong. 606-07 (1978) (statement of Ernest J.E. Griffes on behalf of the American Society for
Personnel Administration) (“[T]he uncertainties of fiduciary responsibilities placed upon plan
administrators is the other area that is of great concern to our members. Perhaps no other
single area of ERISA has caused greater consternation among persons with responsibility for
benefit plan administration.”); id. at 613 (“The fiduciary liability provisions and the so called
‘Prudent Man Rule’ of ERISA seem to our members to be unduly onerous and an unnecessary
overkill in protecting the rights of plan participants.”); GEORGE E. RAY & HARRY V. LAMON ,
JR., FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE NEW PENSION REFORM ACT 85 (1976 Supp.)
(observing that it remains to be seen whether regulations to be issued by the Secretaries of
Labor and Treasury will ameliorate a situation of “overkill,” and guessing that the statute will
soon need to be amended). The “overkill” refrain seems to have been picked up from a January
1975 story in Fortune magazine, which quoted Preston C. Bassett, Vice President of Towers,
Perrin, Forster & Crosby, describing the pension reform law generally as “overkill.” Faltermayer, supra note 17, at 81.
19. See infra note 40. In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the Supreme Court explained:
[ERISA’s] fiduciary duties draw much of their content from the common law of
trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA’s enactment. See
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (“[R]ather than explicitly enumerating all of the
powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility”) ....
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to exacting duties of loyalty and care backed by personal liability in
the event of breach, but that exposure is readily sidestepped. The
intended trustee can decline appointment, or can agree to serve only
if the settlor relaxes the force of fiduciary obligations by including
exculpatory clauses in the trust instrument.20 Under ERISA, in contrast, robust fiduciary responsibility appears inescapable. Congress
adopted a functional definition of fiduciary so that all benefit plan
decision makers, asset custodians, and paid investment advisors can
be called to account—not just the legal owner of the fund.21 Hence
actions and authority, rather than formal conveyancing and consent, establish who owes duties to plan participants. And by voiding
exculpatory clauses, Congress prohibited employee benefit plan
sponsors from lowering ERISA’s prescribed standards of acceptable
fiduciary conduct.22 Compared to the status quo ante, ERISA apparently created an entirely new high-risk environment for pension
and welfare benefit plan sponsors and service providers, a regime
that imposed broadly applicable uncompromising obligations.
Early administrative action calmed industry nerves by postponing the effective date of certain provisions,23 establishing procedures
for applying for administrative exemptions from ERISA’s prohibited
We also recognize, however, that trust law does not tell the entire story. After
all, ERISA’s standards and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional
determination that the common law of trusts did not offer completely
satisfactory protection.
516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. §§ 102(1), 222 (AM . LAW INST. 1959); see John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 650-51, 659-60
(1995).
21. See ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012); PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA:
PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 16, 110 (2010).
22. See ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a); WIEDENBECK , supra note 21, at 124-25
(discussing the policy rationale for the prohibition of exculpatory provisions).
23. See ERISA § 414(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1114(b)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.414b-1 (1975) (removed
by 61 Fed. Reg. 33,847-01 (July 1, 1996)) (postponing the effective date of ERISA sections 402,
403, and 405 for plans in existence on the date of ERISA’s enactment until January 1, 1976,
but delaying the ban on exculpatory provisions only until July 1, 1975); see also Steven J.
Sacher, Assoc. Solicitor of Labor, Address Before the ABA National Institute on Fiduciary
Responsibility (June 11, 1976), in Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at A-5 (June 21, 1976) (equating
the first phase of Labor Department implementation of ERISA, which included postponing
the effective date of various provisions of Title I and granting certain temporary prohibited
transaction exemptions, to “firefighting, or if you prefer, administering combinations of aspirin and tranquilizer on a very selective basis to alleviate certain splitting headaches and badly
jangled nerves”).
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transactions,24 and setting some regulatory boundaries on the reach
of “fiduciary” classification.25 Yet ERISA’s wide-ranging authorization
24. ERISA Procedure 75-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,471 (Apr. 28, 1975) (implementing ERISA
§ 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a)); Rev. Proc. 75-26, 1975-1 C.B. 722 (establishing exemption procedures under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2)); see also Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption (PTCE)
75-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 50,845 (Oct. 31, 1975) (permitting for a limited time certain transactions
involving employee benefit plans and broker-dealers), extended by 43 Fed. Reg. 32,196 (July
25, 1978); PTCE 76-1, 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740 (Mar. 26, 1976) (permitting certain transactions
involving multiemployer and multiple employer plans, including delinquent contributions,
construction loans by plans covering employees in the building and construction trades, and
arrangements for provision of office space administrative service by the plan to a participating
employer or union).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, Q&A D-1 (2017) (interpretive bulletin issued June 25, 1975,
stating that professional service providers, such as attorneys, accountants, actuaries, and
consultants, are not ordinarily fiduciaries because such advisers usually lack ultimate decision-making responsibility for benefit plans); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q&A D-2 (2017) (interpretive bulletin issued October 3, 1975, providing that “a person who performs purely ministerial
functions ... for an employee benefit plan within a framework of policies, interpretations,
rules, practices and procedures made by other persons is not a fiduciary because such person
does not have discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of the
plan,” nor does he “exercise any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of the assets of the plan”).
The statute classifies as a fiduciary any person who renders investment advice for a fee or
other direct or indirect compensation regardless of authority or control over plan or asset
management. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii). Regulations issued in 1975 restricted that category to persons rendering investment advice on a regular basis pursuant to
an understanding that the advice would be individualized and would form the primary basis
of investment decisions with respect to plan assets. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1)(ii) (2015)
(amended by Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550)).
That narrowing of the fiduciary definition has been a source of controversy recently, as
under the Obama Administration the Employee Benefits Security Administration moved to
treat the provision of investment advice or recommendations in a broader range of circumstances as giving rise to fiduciary status under ERISA and the Code. The new definition
captures compensated investment advice provided to an individual retirement account (IRA)
or IRA owner, not just regular advisory services rendered to an employee benefit plan, plan
fiduciary, participant, or beneficiary. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (2017). The objective of the new
rule is to protect retirement savings from being diverted into high-cost investment
alternatives on the basis of recommendations provided by investment advisers acting under
conflicts of interests, a problem that has become acute in recent years as participant-directed
401(k) plans have risen to dominate the U.S. private pension system. See Definition of the
Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,928, 21,932 (Apr. 20, 2015) (notice of proposed rulemaking and explanation of background
and purpose of revised fiduciary definition). When first aired, the proposal was met with
organized, widespread, and intense opposition and lobbying by financial advisers and the
securities industry. Pitched opposition to the original 2010 proposed expansion of the fiduciary definition led to its withdrawal and the development of the 2015 notice of proposed
rulemaking. See id.; see also Definition of the Term “Fiduciary” Proposed Rule, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-
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of civil enforcement actions26 left most issues that would determine
the effect of the new fiduciary responsibility regime to be worked
out, for good or ill, by the federal courts.
comments/1210-AB32 [https://perma.cc/7W8A-SC2G] (withdrawn Apr. 20, 2015) (October
2010 notice of proposed rulemaking and public comments thereon).
Financial industry opposition to the rule continued post-adoption, and shortly after taking
office President Donald Trump directed the Labor Department to reconsider the rule.
Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Feb. 3, 2017). That
reconsideration resulted in an initial sixty-day delay—to June 9, 2017—in the applicability
date of the rule, and allowed fiduciaries to qualify for certain prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs) from the rule for the duration of 2017 solely by complying with impartial conduct
standards. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902 (Apr. 7, 2017). A relaxed temporary enforcement
policy and transition period guidance was also announced. See Conflict of Interest FAQs, U.S.
DEP’T LABOR (Aug. 2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/
resource-center/faqs/coi-transition-period-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8SH-XC3N]. While nominally in force as of June 9, 2017, the Labor Department sought additional public input on the
fiduciary rule while considering further revisions and additional postponement. Field
Assistance Bulletin No. 2017-02, U.S. DEP’T LABOR (May 22, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2017-02
[https://perma.cc/2Z9D-PS8S] [hereinafter Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2017-02, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR] (announcing that during the period before January 1, 2018, the Labor Department
“will not pursue claims against fiduciaries who are working diligently and in good faith to
comply with the fiduciary duty rule and exemptions, or treat those fiduciaries as being in
violation of the fiduciary duty rule and exemptions,” nor will the IRS apply the prohibited
transaction excise tax of I.R.C. § 4975); see Request for Information Regarding the Fiduciary
Rule and Prohibited Transaction Exemptions, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,278 (July 6, 2017). Indications
are that the Labor Department will move to revise the rule in conjunction with the SEC,
which during the Obama Administration declined to become involved. Alexander Acosta,
Deregulators Must Follow the Law, so Regulators Will Too, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2017, at A19
(“[T]he SEC has critical expertise in this area. I hope in this administration the SEC will be
a full participant.”); Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2017-02, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, supra. The
special transition period for the prohibited transaction exemptions was extended until July
1, 2019,
to give the Department of Labor the time necessary to consider public comments
under the criteria set forth in the Presidential Memorandum of February 3,
2017, including whether possible changes and alternatives to these exemptions
would be appropriate in light of the current comment record and potential input
from, and action by, the Securities and Exchange Commission and state insurance commissioners.
18-Month Extension of Transition Period and Delay of Applicability Dates, 82 Fed. Reg.
56,545 (Nov. 29, 2017).
26. ERISA § 502(a)(2)-(3), (e)-(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3), (e)-(g) (authorizing suits by
plan participants or beneficiaries to enforce ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility standards, or to
obtain appropriate equitable relief to prevent or redress violations of ERISA or the terms of
an employee benefit plan, conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts regardless
of the amount in controversy, and permitting discretionary awards of attorney’s fees and
costs).
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A. The Fischel-Langbein Proposal
Judicial implementation of the fiduciary regime was not entirely
for the good, according to a famous study by Professors Daniel
Fischel and John Langbein that analyzed a dozen years of case law
under ERISA.27
ERISA fiduciary law has not been widely reckoned to be on the
list of ERISA’s major blunders. In the present article we show
that it belongs there. We observe that the central concept of
ERISA fiduciary law, the exclusive benefit rule, misdescribes the
reality of the modern pension and employee benefit trust. We
show that the contradictions of the exclusive benefit rule bedevil
a remarkable array of the main issues in modern pension trust
administration: takeover cases, social investing, employee stock
ownership schemes, asset reversions from terminated plans, and
judicial review of benefit denials and other plan decisions. We
emphasize that the mess in ERISA fiduciary law cannot be
ameliorated until courts and other decision makers recognize the
multiplicity of interests that inhere in the modern pension and
employee benefit trust.28

Adopting a law and economics perspective,29 Fischel and Langbein
identify two central problems with straightforward application of
the exclusive benefit rule. First, it ignores the sponsoring employer’s interests in employee benefit programs.30 Second, it treats the
interests of plan participants as monolithic and homogenous, neglecting the often conflicting priorities of different groups of
employees.31

27. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105 (1988).
28. Id. at 1107.
29. See id. at 1113-17 (discussing “[e]conomic [p]erspectives on [t]rust [l]aw [f]iduciary
[d]uties”).
30. See id. at 1117-19, 1122, 1124, 1127-28, 1137 (arguing that “[p]ension and other benefit plans will not be established unless they are in the mutual interest of employers and
employees” and providing examples of employer interests).
31. See id. at 1119-21, 1139-42, 1144-49, 1159-60 (examining conflicts between younger
and older workers during takeover cases and over investments made to preserve jobs).
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To accommodate those varying interests and achieve Congress’s
goal of broad provision of pension and welfare benefits to workers
in private industry, they argue that ERISA should be interpreted
and applied in a manner that will maximize the value of the benefit
plan to all interested parties.32 As a component of the employment
contract, an employee benefit plan should be construed from an ex
ante perspective to augment, to the fullest extent possible, the joint
welfare of the employer and employee-participants.33 Notwithstanding the narrow traditional focus of the private trust law duty of
loyalty, Fischel and Langbein hypothesized that ERISA’s exclusive
benefit rule could be adapted to that end. Only two steps would be
required to do so, they suggested. First, instead of treating the employer as functioning solely as trust settlor, federal courts ought to
recognize that the sponsoring employer is in substance a co-beneficiary of the employee benefit plan.34 As such, the employer has sometimes-distinct interests that deserve ongoing furtherance.35 Second,
the divergent priorities of different subgroups of employees should
be acknowledged, respected, and accommodated by crafting reasonable compromises between their competing objectives.36 This could
be accomplished by importing the traditional trust law duty of
impartiality into ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility regime.37 In applying the impartiality mandate, the authors apparently envisioned
taking into account both the heterogeneous goals of various subsets
of plan participants and the employer’s interests as co-beneficiary

32. Id. at 1125 (“In a world of voluntary plan formation, if the contracting parties understood that the legal standards for evaluating plan decisionmaking had become more realistic
and more reasonable, they would be more likely to form plans and to establish higher levels
of pension saving.”).
33. Id. at 1158-59 (emphasizing the importance of the ex ante perspective wherein the
employee and employer interests converge and arguing that “[t]he correct interpretation of
fiduciary duties is the rule that maximizes the joint welfare of both”); accord id. at 1118-19,
1125, 1127-28, 1137-38.
34. See id. at 1158 (“We believe that ERISA permits the courts to be more forthright in
recognizing the employer’s interest as beneficiary.”).
35. See id. at 1128, 1143.
36. See id. at 1141-42 (arguing that diversity of worker priorities “is an argument for balancing the conflicting interests among [employees], not for denying the existence of conflicts”).
37. See id. at 1159-60 (advocating that courts should recognize an implied duty of
impartiality under ERISA); accord id. at 1121.
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(from the first step, described above).38 The article, however, never
quite says that in so many words.
Fischel and Langbein seemed to think that their recommended
doctrinal innovations would do no great violence to ERISA’s fiduciary policing system. While the exclusive benefit rule was derived
from the trust law duty of loyalty,39 Congress was aware of differences between private trusts (most commonly used as vehicles for
intergenerational donative transfers of family wealth) and employee
benefit plans, and it intended the courts to interpret and apply
ERISA in a manner that would adjust for those differences.40 In particular, the absence of effective monitoring by the (often deceased or
incapacitated) settlor or the (often minor, unborn, or inexpert)
beneficiaries calls for holding the trustee of a private trust to a strict
and inflexible duty of loyalty.41 In contrast, both the employer and
employees continually monitor the performance of employee benefit
plan fiduciaries, so “there may be less need for strict fiduciary duties
that limit the discretion of the trustee to engage in conduct that may
be mutually beneficial to both groups.”42 Nevertheless, the authors
38. See id. at 1158 (“The correct interpretation of [ERISA] fiduciary duties is the rule that
maximizes the joint welfare of both [employer and employees].”).
39. Id. at 1113.
40. H.R. REP. NO . 93-1280, at 302 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 3 SUBCOMM . ON LABOR
OF THE S. COMM . ON LABOR AND PUB . WELFARE , LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 4277, 4569 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (“The conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and
purpose of employee benefit plans.”); H.R. REP. NO . 93-533, at 12 (1973), reprinted in 2 ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 2348, 2359 (“[R]eliance on conventional trust law often is
insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. This is
because trust law had developed in the context of testamentary and inter vivos trusts (usually
designed to pass designated property to an individual or small group of persons) .... [T]he
typical employee benefit plan, covering hundreds or even thousands of participants, is quite
different from the testamentary trust both in purpose and in nature.”); S. REP. NO . 93-127, at
29 (1973), reprinted in 1 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 587, 615 (same). Moreover,
a leading proponent of comprehensive pension reform legislation emphasized that “[i]t is also
intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.” 120 Cong.
Rec. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra, at 4733, 4771.
41. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1114-15 (suggesting that strict fiduciary
duties substitute for monitoring by parties interested in private trust); see also Robert H.
Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW 197, 198-200 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
42. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1119; see also id. at 1113 (“[I]t is far from clear
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caution that in some situations “conventional safeguards such as
union monitoring and the employer’s reputational incentives are not
adequate to protect the interests of employees. In these cases, the
courts have been properly sensitive to the possibility of self-interested action by nonneutral fiduciaries to the detriment of the
employees.”43
The Fischel-Langbein proposal would sensitively modulate the
content of the exclusive benefit rule, ERISA’s duty of loyalty,
according to the context. The judiciary would be assigned the task
of maximizing the joint welfare of the employer and covered employees, evaluated from an ex ante perspective. To do so, courts
would adjust traditional trust doctrine by subsuming the employer
into the category of plan beneficiaries and invoking a duty of
impartiality to discriminatingly craft sensible compromises between
the competing goals of all parties with a stake in the benefit program. That’s a tall order.
Conceptually, the Fischel-Langbein proposal is compelling. It is
apparently the most frequently cited ERISA article in the scholarly
literature, yet it has gotten no traction in the courts.44 Perhaps it
asks too much of the judiciary. Overwhelmed judges struggling to
get control of their dockets might be expected to prefer reliance on
formal rules that facilitate resort to summary disposition. More
likely, judicial reluctance to adopt or engage the approach stems
from its poor fit with the statutory language. Fiduciaries are commanded to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... for the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries.”45 The “participant” category is
that the private gratuitous trust and the employee benefit plan are really comparable.... We
suggest that these differences undercut the rationale for routine application of trust law rules
to employee benefit plans.”).
43. Id. at 1133.
44. See Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the
ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 462 & n.6 (2015). The author
conducted a Westlaw search for “ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction” and found that the
Fischel-Langbein article had been cited in only 15 federal cases as of mid-June 2015, while
135 articles appearing in law reviews and journals cited it. The same search conducted on
Lexis returned citations in 14 federal cases and 121 law journal articles.
45. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012); accord ERISA § 403(c)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (Supp. III 2016) (subject to specified exceptions, “the assets of a plan
shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes
of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying rea-
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restricted to employees or former employees of an employer,46 and
although in this usage “benefits” is not explicitly defined, in context
it clearly refers to the type of benefit—pension, health care, life
insurance, et cetera—that the plan was established to provide to the
company’s workforce.47 Consequently the employer’s goals, whether
they be reducing compensation expense or promoting personnel
policies (for example, reducing workforce turnover, increasing productivity, or encouraging retirement of older workers), do not sit
well as “benefits” provided “to participants.”48
Transplanting a duty to act impartially into ERISA is similarly
problematic, even if limited to employee-participants. ERISA does
not broadly commission the fiduciary to advance any interest of
participants and beneficiaries; rather, it narrowly authorizes the
fiduciary to discharge her duties for the purpose of providing plan
benefits or defraying reasonable expenses of administering the

sonable expenses of administering the plan”); I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (2012) (stating that qualified
pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan must be “for the exclusive benefit of [the
employer’s] employees or their beneficiaries”).
46. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). The term “beneficiary” is defined as “a person
designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8). While it could be
argued that the sponsoring employer is designated by the terms of the plan to receive certain
advantages, those employer advantages are not “plan benefits” as commonly understood, and
the plan designation to which the statute refers seems to contemplate the specification of a
substitute taker for benefits earned by the employee-participant. Nevertheless, some lower
courts have opined that the plan designation prong of the definition of “beneficiary” might be
stretched to comprehend partners or sole proprietors (working owners of unincorporated
businesses) who are covered under a welfare or pension plan. See, e.g., Peterson v. Am. Life
& Health Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 404, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1995); Lain v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 27
F. Supp. 2d 926, 934-35 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
47. See ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (defining welfare plan as “any plan, fund, or
program ... to the extent that [it] was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing
for its participants or their beneficiaries” any benefit of a type listed in the statute); ERISA
§ 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (defining pension plan as a plan, fund, or program “to the extent
that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances” it “provides retirement
income to employees, or ... results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending
to the termination of covered employment or beyond”).
48. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (2014) (“Read in the
context of ERISA as a whole, the term ‘benefits’ in [ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule] must be
understood to refer to the sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees
who manage investments typically seek to secure for the trust’s beneficiaries.... The term does
not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those supposed to arise from employee ownership of
employer stock.”).
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plan.49 Hence the interest of a group of young employees in retaining
their jobs, for example, cannot be taken into consideration in administering a pension plan, and surely cannot justify compromising
older workers’ interest in financial security in retirement.50 The
plain meaning of the statute suggests that Congress set an immutable priority, leaving the courts no room to tinker or adjust interests
in response to changes in the workplace (such as the employer’s
financial condition, employment levels, or workforce demographics).51 If the daunting rigors and inflexibility of ERISA’s fiduciary
obligations were to be ameliorated, then the courts would have to
find some other relief valve.

49. See supra note 45.
50. See ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2017) (detailing
the Labor Department’s position concerning economically targeted investments that “an
investment will not be prudent if it would be expected to provide a plan with a lower rate of
return than available alternative investments with commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier
than alternative available investments with commensurate rates of return”); id. (stating that
the exclusive benefit rule “prohibit[s] a fiduciary from subordinating the interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives”); ERISA
Interpretive Bulletin 08-2, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2016) (withdrawn and replaced by ERISA
Interpretive Bulletin 2016-01, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,879, 95,882 (Dec. 29, 2016) (codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 2509.2016-01)) (stating the Labor Department position concerning exercise of
shareholder rights, which provides that in voting proxies a fiduciary should “consider only
those factors that relate to the economic value of the plan’s investment and shall not
subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to
unrelated objectives”; the “use of pension plan assets by plan fiduciaries to further policy or
political issues through proxy resolutions that have no connection to enhancing the economic
value of the plan’s investment in a corporation would, in the view of the Department, violate
the prudence and exclusive purpose requirements of section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B)”). Compare
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1120-21, 1159-60 (advocating resort to duty of
impartiality to mediate competition between retirement security and interests of other
participants), with WIEDENBECK , supra note 21, at 123-24 (asserting that interests other than
obtaining plan benefits are not cognizable under ERISA).
51. In the context of prohibited transactions, the statute twice juxtaposes “the interests
of the plan” with “the interests of its participants and beneficiaries,” see ERISA §§ 406(b)(2),
408(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(b)(2), 1108(a)(2), which might be taken as congressional
acknowledgement that those interests can sometimes diverge. Perhaps that contrast could
have been seized upon to create an opening (or interpretive wedge) for judicial recognition of
the employer’s interests and the sort of nuanced interest balancing that Fischel and Langbein
advocated. No such line of analysis emerged. That might be attributable to the uncertain
significance of the juxtaposition, or to fact that ERISA’s specification of baseline fiduciary
duties refers solely to the interests of participants and beneficiaries. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).

1024

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1007

B. The Muir-Stein Exposition
In time the courts did indeed find another fiduciary relief valve—
one that is susceptible to bright-line formal application and far more
compatible with ERISA’s language. In a 2015 article, Professors
Dana Muir and Norman Stein explained that the distinction between settlor and fiduciary functions has emerged as the premier
doctrinal mechanism with which the judiciary injects flexibility into
ERISA’s apparently uncompromising fiduciary standards.52 Rather
than accepting the invitation (by Professors Fischel and Langbein)
to recognize the sponsoring employer as a coordinate plan beneficiary, “[c]ourts have used this distinction between ‘settlor’ and
‘fiduciary’ functions to recognize the employer’s own interests in
employee benefit plans and to mediate between those interests and
the statute’s command that plan decisions be made in the exclusive
interest of the plan’s participants.”53
The settlor/fiduciary distinction is founded on ERISA’s definition
of fiduciary, which provides in part that:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i)
he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii)
he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property
of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.54

Putting aside clause (ii) on paid investment advisers, the statutory
definition is keyed to “management” or “administration” of the plan
or control of its assets,55 and fiduciary status is expressly limited “to
the extent” that one serves in the designated roles.56 Other relationships to a plan, including establishing, altering, or terminating
the benefit program, apparently are not subsumed within the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 462-64.
Id. at 459.
ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996).
See WIEDENBECK, supra note 21, at 110-20.
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implementation activities indicated by plan management or administration. Accordingly, fundamental plan design decisions, analogous to a settlor’s actions in setting the terms of a private trust, are
immune from fiduciary oversight.57
Consequently, the obligation to act “solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries” does not attach to plan design
decisions, leaving employers free (subject to ERISA’s content
controls) to structure the program to maximal business advantage. That flexibility to tailor benefit plans to best promote the
sponsor’s personnel policies is crucial to the maintenance of
ERISA’s delicate balance between public regulation and private
sponsorship.58

The Supreme Court impressed the force of the settlor/fiduciary
distinction upon lower courts and benefits practitioners in Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson.59 The controversy involved a defined benefit plan that required participating employees to contribute toward
funding.60 The plan became substantially overfunded, enabling the
company to dispense with employer contributions for several years
while workers continued paying into the fund.61 Then, with the plan
still overfunded, Hughes amended the plan to provide increased
early retirement benefits for one group of employees and to eliminate the employee contribution requirement for newly hired workers.62 Not surprisingly, participants viewed this application of
surplus assets as a diversion of their money (accumulated employee
contributions) to serve the employer’s interests.63 In an opinion by
57. See Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 890.
58. WIEDENBECK , supra note 21, at 114.
59. 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
60. See id. at 435.
61. See id. at 436.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 437. The House version of pension reform legislation included a provision
that would have required surplus assets attributable to earnings on employee contributions
to be distributed on plan termination to employees in proportion to their contributions. H.R.
2, 93d Cong. § 112(d)(1) (1974) (as passed by House, Feb. 28, 1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 3898, 3960. The report of the Committee on Education and Labor explained:
The Committee also has made provision for contributory plans to equitably
distribute any surplus funds remaining on plan termination to the participants
in accordance with their rate of contribution. This requirement is applicable only
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Justice Clarence Thomas, the Hughes Court unanimously dismissed
numerous asserted ERISA violations on two grounds. First, participants have no rights in a defined benefit plan’s surplus assets, even
if attributable in part to the growth of their own contributions,
because their statutorily protected interest is prescribed by reference to their accrued benefits.64 Second, ERISA’s fiduciary provisions are inapplicable because “without exception, ‘[p]lan sponsors
who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries.’”65 That conclusion applies to both welfare and pension plans,
and without regard to whether employees contribute, “for the simple
reason that the plain language of the statute defining fiduciary
makes no distinction.”66
As a brake on fiduciary oversight, the settlor/fiduciary distinction
offers several advantages. As Justice Thomas emphasized, the
doctrine is consistent with, if not compelled by, the statutory language.67 In broad outline, the doctrine seems to offer a sensible
accommodation between ERISA’s competing policies of protecting
employee reliance and preserving employer autonomy.68 And it
promises ease of application (with an attendant reduction in
litigation) through resort to a formal bright-line rule69: adoption,
after plan assets have been used to satisfy all liabilities. The Committee believes
it is unfair to permit the complete recapture by employers of surplus funds in
terminated contributory plans, without regard to the fact that contributions by
the workers helped to generate the surplus. The Committee wishes to emphasize
that while it is not passing judgment on any particular case now pending, it has
concluded that equitable principles require that this particular subject be governed by a specific rule which reflects what the Committee regards as essential
protection for the interests of workers in such plans.
H.R. REP. NO . 93-533, at 12-13 (1973), reprinted in 2 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
40, at 2348, 2359-60.
The surplus-sharing rule of the House bill was dropped in conference, without comment on
what “equitable principles require.” See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 375 (1974), reprinted in 3
ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, at 4277, 4642.
64. See Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 440-41.
65. Id. at 445 (alteration in original) (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890
(1996)).
66. Id. at 444.
67. See id. But see Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 516, 533 (arguing that “the Supreme
Court’s expansive and rigid iteration of the doctrine was inconsistent with the statute’s structure” and could have been avoided with a less “absolutist” interpretation).
68. See supra text accompanying note 58.
69. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 463-64 (claiming the distinction “has become a formalistic and mechanically applied rule” that “has made it relatively easy for courts to decide
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amendment, or termination of an employee benefit plan invariably
represents a non-fiduciary design decision—a settlor function.
Apart from doctrinal fit and judicial economy, the settlor/fiduciary
distinction carries with it some disadvantages as well. Foremost
among them is its binary, all-or-nothing nature. Any particular
action or decision with respect to a plan is either undertaken in a
fiduciary capacity, triggering an unyielding set of statutory protections, or it is done by a nonfiduciary entirely unconstrained by
the expectations, needs, and interests of participants and beneficiaries. This categorical approach is the antithesis of the nuanced,
fact-intensive balancing of employer and employee interests advocated by Fischel and Langbein.70 Rather than sensitively modulating the content of fiduciary obligations according to the context, the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine mechanically limits the scope of the
obligations, arguably using a hatchet instead of a scalpel. Moreover,
the doctrine’s formalism invites manipulation and evasion: consider,
for example, plan amendments calling for administrative action that
would otherwise be subject to fiduciary review.71
Professors Muir and Stein level two broad indictments against
the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. First, it generates “decisions that are
unmoored from the nuanced policy considerations that animated
Congress in enacting ERISA and ... should anchor ERISA jurisprudence.”72 Second, the doctrine “can allow employers to design plans
to permit fiduciary behavior that would be flatly impermissible if
not expressly provided by the plan’s terms.”73 They back up their
charges with an extended bill of particulars—the centerpiece of
cases”); accord id. at 535.
70. See supra Part I.A; cf. Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 464 (arguing that “the settlor/fiduciary doctrine ignores policies and concerns that should be balanced against the
interests that the doctrine advances” including encouraging employers to sponsor plans); id.
at 549 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision to locate [the settlor/fiduciary doctrine’s] core in
explicit statutory language rather than in a federal common law created doctrinal rigidity.”).
71. Examples include adoption of plan terms mandating that the menu of investment
choices offered under a participant-directed defined contribution plan include specified investments, see infra note 262 and accompanying text, or conditioning access to a new pension
distribution option (such as early retirement benefits) on the employee’s waiver of claims
against the employer, Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 522-23; infra notes 143-44 and
accompanying text, or even requiring the employee “to tattoo the corporate logo onto the
employee’s forehead,” Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 523.
72. Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 464 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. For a possible limitation on this principle, see infra note 100.
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their article is an extensive catalog of troublesome outcomes produced by the settlor/fiduciary distinction.74 The doctrine, they conclude, frequently undermines employee expectations, allows the
plan sponsor to dilute or negate various statutory requirements, and
empowers the employer to exploit regulatory voids created by
ERISA’s broad preemption of state law.75
There is no need to rehearse the full catalog of its faults, but a few
examples of problematic applications of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine will prove useful. As described earlier, surplus assets of an
overfunded defined benefit pension plan may be redeployed by plan
amendment to increase the benefits of a select group of plan
participants, even if the surplus is attributable to the growth of
employee contributions previously required of all participants.76
Workers covered under such a contributory defined benefit plan may
expect to share the gain from outstanding performance of investments that they helped finance, but they are mistaken. The sponsor
may utilize the surplus to reduce future contributions or increase
benefits for some workers, yet no fiduciary liability attaches to plan
alterations designed to serve the employer’s interests (improve
company finances or promote its recruitment or personnel policies).
Similarly, a defined benefit plan may be amended to provide
subsidized early retirement benefits and condition access to the
enhanced benefits on the participant’s release of any employmentrelated claims against the employer.77 The amendment is a
nonfiduciary settlor function because “[p]lan sponsors who alter the
terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries.”78
Moreover, plan fiduciaries who implement such an early retirement
incentive program do not thereby engage in a prohibited transaction
(using plan assets for the benefit of a party in interest)79 because
“the payment of benefits in exchange for the performance of some
condition by the employee” is not the sort of transaction Congress

74. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 484-514.
75. See id. at 516-31.
76. See the discussion of Hughes Aircraft Corp. v. Jacobson, supra text accompanying
notes 59-67.
77. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 895 (1996); see also Muir & Stein, supra
note 44, at 522-23 (discussing Lockheed).
78. Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 890.
79. See ERISA §§ 3(14)(C), 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(14)(C), 1106(a)(1)(D) (2012).
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meant to bar.80 Muir and Stein posit that there is “no overriding
limiting principle in ERISA that would prevent an employer from
negotiating special benefits to induce a particular employee to settle
a lawsuit or barter away other rights.”81 They even suggest that
there is nothing in ERISA to stop the employer from writing the
plan to require the employee “to tattoo the corporate logo onto the
employee’s forehead” as a condition on eligibility for benefits.82
The settlor/fiduciary doctrine also yields some startling—perhaps shocking—results as applied to welfare plans. Consider US
Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, which involved a self-funded health
care plan’s claim for reimbursement from a participant’s tort recovery.83 McCutchen, a US Airways employee, was seriously injured in
an automobile accident as a result of which the plan paid $66,866
in medical expenses.84 The deadly crash was the fault of the other
driver, but due to limited insurance and competing claimants
McCutchen’s attorneys obtained only $110,000, yielding a net
recovery of $66,000 after deducting the lawyers’ 40 percent contingent fee.85 US Airways demanded $66,866 under a plan provision
requiring reimbursement of amounts paid by the plan “out of any
monies recovered from [a] third party,”86 even though full reimbursement exceeded McCutchen’s net recovery and would have
left him worse off for having brought suit.87 “[I]n effect, he would
pay for the privilege of serving as US Airways’ collection agent.”88
McCutchen maintained that equity required reimbursement of US
Airways only to the extent that he would be overcompensated, and
that this “double recovery” doctrine did not apply because the
settlement, being less than the damages sustained due to lost earnings and pain and suffering, did not pay for his medical expenses.89
Alternatively, he asserted that the “common-fund” doctrine required
that the costs of obtaining the settlement be fairly apportioned
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 895.
Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 523.
Id. at 522-23.
569 U.S. 88 (2013).
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 96.
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between all those who benefit.90 The Court concluded that the terms
of the plan (“any monies recovered”) negated the double recovery
doctrine but did not clearly override the common-fund doctrine.91
Because the plan’s reimbursement provision did not expressly
address the costs of obtaining a third-party recovery, it was
interpreted to retain the common-fund rule.92 Presumably, that left
McCutchen with nothing from the settlement, but not less than
nothing. This decision, Muir and Stein lament, “implies that a plan
may enforce any written terms that are not directly inconsistent
with ERISA’s requirements, suggesting few legal limits on onerous
plan terms.”93
Welfare plan cases also permit the employer to favor one group of
participants over another, as in the pension cases described earlier.
An amendment reducing the lifetime cap on health care benefits
from $1 million to $5000 for expenses related to AIDS, which was
imposed soon after the employer learned that one of its employees
had contracted AIDS, was tolerated when the change applied prospectively and across the board.94 The cost-saving amendment, even
if it stemmed from prejudice against AIDS or its victims, was not
impermissible retaliation (like firing) against the employee for
exercising his rights under the plan (filing claims), nor did it
interfere with the attainment of any right to which the employee
might become entitled, because ERISA does not require vesting of
welfare benefits and the employer never promised that the $1
million coverage limit would remain in effect.95
90. Id.
91. See id. at 98-101 (enforcing the equitable lien by agreement requires the refusal to
apply the general rules of equity “at odds with parties expressed commitments”); id. at 103
(noting that the plan gives US Airways the first claim on entire recovery, which is incompatible with the double recovery rules, which “would give McCutchen first dibs on the portion of
the recovery compensating for losses that the plan did not cover (e.g., future earnings or pain
and suffering)”).
92. See id. at 101-04.
93. Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 507.
94. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
95. See id. at 405; see also ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012). Although acceptable under ERISA at the time the case arose, subsequent legislation now prohibits the kind of health
condition discrimination exemplified by McGann. The Americans with Disabilities Act
outlaws disability-based coverage distinctions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012); 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1630.4(a)(1)(vi), 1630.6(b) (2016). In addition, the Affordable Care Act prohibits monetary
caps on benefits, and its requirements were imported into ERISA. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11;
ERISA § 715, 29 U.S.C. § 1185d; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2711 (2017).
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Even without a formal plan amendment, welfare benefits can
sometimes be redirected without fiduciary oversight. Professors
Muir and Stein call this the business decision strand of the settlor/
fiduciary doctrine.96 For example, the president of a company that
wanted to induce certain key engineers to relocate from New Jersey
to Tennessee following a merger announced that engineers refusing
to transfer would not receive severance pay under a plan that
“provided for benefits to employees who were ‘involuntarily terminated’ when ‘the terminating manager believes the granting of such
pay is appropriate.’”97 Other employees who declined to relocate
were granted severance,98 but the court upheld the denial of benefits
to engineers who would not move as a “business decision” not subject to fiduciary obligations.99 Certain actions, it seems, are inherently design decisions—settlor functions—and are immune from
fiduciary monitoring even if they are not accomplished by the adoption, amendment, or termination of a plan.100 Such core plan design
96. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 485; accord id. at 490-93, 496, 502, 504, 512-14.
97. Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 188 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1999). Professors Muir
and Stein discuss the case at some length. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 491-93, 508,
528.
98. Noorily, 188 F.3d at 160.
99. Id. at 158 (holding that employer does not act as fiduciary “when designing or making
business decisions allowed for by a plan”).
100. Conversely, it can be argued that certain acts are inherently fiduciary in nature, and
as such remain subject to intensive scrutiny under ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility provisions
even if the acts are expressly mandated by the terms of the plan. Under this view, essential
components of plan management or administration cannot be hard-wired by plan amendment.
Recognizing such a category of inherently fiduciary actions would prevent deliberate abuse
of the settlor function doctrine, see supra text accompanying note 73, but it could not be
accomplished without a retreat from the Court’s uncompromising dicta that “without exception, ‘[p]lan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries.’”
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 445 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996)). That brash pronouncement could—and
should—be moderated by the sentences that precede it, which treat plan design decisions as
settlor acts and seem to acknowledge that in some exceptional instances a plan amendment
may not involve a design decision.
In general, an employer’s decision to amend a pension plan concerns the
composition or design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer’s
fiduciary duties which consist of such actions as the administration of the plan’s
assets. ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirement simply is not implicated where
Hughes, acting as the Plan’s settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or
structure of the Plan such as who is entitled to receive Plan benefits and in what
amounts, or how such benefits are calculated.
Id. at 444 (emphasis added) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983)).
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elements presumably include the identification of plan participants
or beneficiaries and the formula for determining the amount of their
contributions or benefits.101
This sample of cases supports the conclusion of Professors Muir
and Stein, that the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, while maintaining a
zone in which the plan sponsor may freely pursue its own interests,
exhibits certain excesses. From the standpoint of the average participant’s expectations and understanding, the results in many cases
hardly seem “protect[ive] [of] ... the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.”102
Fischel and Langbein cautioned that, absent intervention, the
exclusive benefit rule would prove overly protective of employees: by
disregarding the employer’s interest in the plan it “will actually
harm employees by discouraging plan formation.”103 Needed flexibility could be achieved, they hypothesized, by treating the employer
In the author’s opinion, ERISA’s central focus on the integrity of asset management shows
investment decision-making to be an inherently fiduciary function. In addition, Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014), arguably supports this conclusion, as explained infra text accompanying notes 266-68.
A statutory exception grants plan fiduciaries immunity from liability for losses resulting
from a participant or beneficiary’s “exercise of control” over the investment of his account under a participant-directed defined contribution plan. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A).
Determination of the investment menu of a participant-directed plan (selection of investment
alternatives) is a necessary predicate for investment decision-making (that is, participant
“exercise of control”). Under an inherent fiduciary function analysis, selection of the
investment menu would be a fiduciary act even if the menu were prescribed by the terms of
the plan. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans (ERISA
Section 404(c) Plans), 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 13, 1992) (observing that
constructing menu of available investment alternatives “is a fiduciary function ... whether
achieved through fiduciary designation or express plan language”). Contra Hecker v. Deere
& Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that the determination of the investment
menu of a section 404(c) plan may be an inherently settlor function and therefore immune
from fiduciary oversight even if the determination is made by plan officials and not set forth
in the plan document). The Labor Department responded to Deere in 2010 by amending the
regulation. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(E)(4)(iv) (2017).
101. Professors Muir and Stein also categorize as falling within the business decision
strand of the settlor function doctrine employer actions that impact benefit programs, but
which relate directly to the payment of corporate obligations, setting employee compensation,
or securities law disclosures. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 496, 502, 512-13. Such
actions are nonfiduciary, not because they inherently involve central elements of plan design,
but rather because they do not involve “management of [the] plan,” “management or disposition of its assets,” rendering investment advice respecting plan assets, or “administration of
[the] plan.” ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
102. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (providing ERISA’s statutory declaration of policy).
103. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1158; accord id. at 1125, 1127-28.
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as a plan beneficiary and importing a duty of impartiality to mediate conflicts among employees.104 That did not happen. Instead, the
distinction between settlor and fiduciary functions emerged as the
doctrinal mechanism that preserves a safe space for employer
action. Muir and Stein contend that the pendulum has swung too
far in the opposite direction: the settlor/fiduciary doctrine “largely
lacks nuance” and “accommodates, if not invites, sharp practices.”105
Inadequate protection of employees’ interests, of course, similarly
discourages plan formation by leading workers to over discount
benefit promises as so much untrustworthy palaver.
II. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AS WEAK PROPERTY
The scholarly analyses of ERISA fiduciary law surveyed in the
preceding Part make important contributions. But even considered
together, the existing literature is incomplete. Fischel and Langbein
identified a pervasive problem—indeed, a “fundamental contradiction”—in the statutory resort to private trust principles to mediate
competing economic interests in the inherently contractual domain
of employee benefits.106 Their prescribed remedy sought to moderate
the force of the exclusive benefit rule by inviting courts to forthrightly take account of the plan sponsor’s objectives.107 The courts
declined the invitation, instead adopting another way to accommodate the employer’s interest in benefit programs—the settlor function doctrine.108 Muir and Stein exposed how that work-around
brought with it serious problems of its own.109 Yet each of these
seminal studies focused on only one dimension of a two-dimensional
puzzle: adapting private trust law to employee benefit plans requires specification of both the scope of fiduciary oversight and its
intensity.
The reaction of alarm by many pension and benefits professionals in the immediate aftermath of ERISA’s enactment reflects a
perception that the new law exposed them to very serious risks of
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 1158-60.
Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 536.
See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1113-25.
Id. at 1158.
See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 462-64.
See id. at 464-65.
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personal liability. The statute’s text and legislative history seemed
to call for broadly applicable fiduciary obligations, strictly applied.110
Professors Fischel and Langbein took the breadth of fiduciary
accountability for granted, but argued that the sponsoring employer’s interest in a benefit plan should be accommodated by moderating the intensity (strictness) of the exclusive benefit rule.111 Their
proposal would have alleviated the apparent inflexibility of ERISA’s
fiduciary duties without circumscribing their scope. The settlor
function doctrine explored by Professors Muir and Stein grants
employers some freedom to pursue their interests, but speaks only
to breadth.112 It limits scope—the range of actions protected by
fiduciary obligations—but does not address the intensity or
strictness of fiduciary obligations in the domain in which they apply.
This Article argues that ERISA’s fiduciary regime is now both
narrowly applied and flexibly enforced. The Article will demonstrate
that a narrow focus on the preservation of accrued benefits,
operating in combination with two components of case law—one
governing employee benefit plan interpretation and the other
addressing conflicts of interest—actually limits both the extent and
the intensity of ERISA’s fiduciary oversight. This perspective—
which might be thought to stand the original understanding of
ERISA’s fiduciary regime on its head—will be called the “weak property thesis.”
The composite force of ERISA’s fiduciary regime can be envisioned as a two-by-two matrix with rows reflecting the extent or
range of application of fiduciary oversight and columns representing
the intensity or stringency of fiduciary duties when they apply. As
shown in the following table, the four quadrants correspond roughly
to the original understanding of ERISA’s fiduciary scheme (broad
and strict), the Fischel-Langbein proposal (broad and flexible), the
Muir-Stein exposition of the settlor function doctrine (narrow and
strict), and the weak property thesis developed here (narrow and
flexible). The weak property thesis (shaded quadrant), it will be
shown, substantially curtails both the operational range and the rigor of fiduciary obligations by ceding to the employer broad authority
110. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
111. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1158.
112. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 493-513 (discussing the breadth and scope of the
settlor function doctrine).
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over both plan amendment and plan interpretation, and combining
that control with sub-rosa relaxation of ERISA’s duties of loyalty
and care (implicit exculpation).
Intensity: Strict Versus Flexible Duties
Extent:
Broad
Versus
Narrow
Application

Broad & Strict:
ERISA text and legislative
history
(Initial industry fears)

Broad & Flexible:
Employer as plan beneficiary
(Fischel-Langbein proposal)

Narrow & Strict:
Settlor function doctrine
(Muir-Stein exposition)

Narrow & Flexible:
Employer amendment authority, interpretive primacy
& implicit exculpation
(Weak property thesis)

Industry’s concern that imposing expansive and uncompromising
duties of loyalty and care would disrupt desirable business practices
and curtail employee benefits (coverage or generosity) could, in
principle, be addressed by pulling back on either the scope or the
strictness of legal accountability. Fischel and Langbein endorsed
the latter approach, moderating the stringency of fiduciary obligations.113 Muir and Stein demonstrated that the courts adopted the
former approach, employing the settlor function doctrine to cabin
the application of fiduciary standards.114 In fact, however, both restrictive strategies are in play, as the courts have covertly degraded
113. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1116-19, 1158. Such a relaxation of duties
to accommodate competing interests is analogous to the “more is less” phenomenon identified
by experts in other fields, which posits that expansion of a right into new arenas leads to a
dilution of the right even when invoked at its traditional core. E.g., Philip Hamburger, More
Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 885-86 (2004). Constitutional law scholars have observed that
expanding the coverage of First Amendment rights could cause courts to shift from affording
absolute protection to core interests, to engaging in a contingent balancing of free exercise
claims. See id. at 874-75. But see John D. Inazu, More Is More: Strengthening Free Exercise,
Speech, and Association, 99 MINN . L. REV. 485, 485-90 (2014) (arguing that expanding the
scope of a right does not always lead to a reduction in protection).
Such a dynamic breadth/depth tradeoff might also manifest itself as “less is more.” In other
words, limiting the scope of operation of the right could preserve (or increase) its force in the
limited domain where it applies. The settlor function doctrine might be viewed as exhibiting
this phenomenon. Alternatively, over time, powerful antagonistic interests could cause deterioration along both dimensions (“less and less”), which, as a descriptive matter, is the
characterization of contemporary ERISA fiduciary law developed here.
114. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 462-63, 493-514.
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the intensity of fiduciary obligations while categorically exempting
from fiduciary oversight actions that alter the terms of a benefit
program. The balance of this Article lays bare the limited and
adulterated trust regime that protects employee benefits. Rather
than broadly safeguarding workers’ reasonable expectations, ERISA
has evolved to admit only a narrow and diluted set of rights in
pension and welfare benefits.
The settlor/fiduciary distinction limits fiduciary oversight to matters involving plan administration, not plan design.115 Eligibility for
benefits, along with the amount and type of benefits, are central
components of plan design, hence exempt from fiduciary oversight.
Does that mean plan sponsors have unchecked power, on an ongoing
basis, to reassign benefits among employees or eliminate them
altogether by plan amendment? If so, ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility provisions would provide no real protection to workers. The
security they purportedly offer could be wiped out in an instant by
an amendment rejiggering earlier plan design decisions. That
consideration implies there must be some limit on plan amendments
that is not grounded in fiduciary law. ERISA does indeed impose
such a limit, which operates to indirectly define workers’ “property”
in employee benefits.116 Moreover, many troubling applications of
the settlor function doctrine proceed unavoidably from the narrowness of the property interest so defined.117
Employee benefits are weak property for two reasons beyond their
narrow definition. Prevailing judicial approaches to plan interpretation accord primacy to the employer’s reading. In some situations
that interpretive dominance allows the plan sponsor to redefine
rights previously granted. And because plan interpretations apply
retroactively, trimming and hedging under the guise of interpretation can sometimes work a withdrawal of benefits that would be
flatly illegal if accomplished by plan amendment.118
The second vulnerability that makes employee benefits weak
property involves the intensity of fiduciary duties rather than their
extent (or range of application). The courts apply the limited abuseof-discretion standard of review to fiduciary decisions if the plan
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 480-84.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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grants the fiduciary discretion to construe its terms, as virtually all
plans now do.119 Even if the fiduciary is a company insider acting
under a conflict of interest, her decisions are accorded considerable
deference—effectively given a presumption of good faith and regularity.120 The practical result is a species of covert or implicit exculpation of employer-regarding decisions, notwithstanding ERISA’s
express override of plan provisions that would relax fiduciary obligations.121
III. PROPERTY DEFINITION: AMENDMENT AUTHORITY
Muir and Stein rightly censure many applications of the settlor
function doctrine as incompletely theorized and highly suspect.122
They think it needs to be pruned back, and they suggest strategies
for doing so.123 Still, the doctrine has a strong conceptual coherence
that is not simply rooted in the appeal of a plain meaning approach
to statutory interpretation. The settlor function doctrine also re119. See infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
121. See infra Part V.B.
122. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 536.
123. See id. at 536-48. Not all of their proffered remedies appear viable. They admit that
statutory readjustment is a political non-starter, so remediation must be left to the courts. See
id. at 536-37. In many situations judicial retrenchment could take the form of collateral limitation: instead of fundamentally revising the Court’s construction of the statutory definition
of fiduciary, this approach would emphasize the implications of ERISA’s substantive protections to set boundaries on unchecked settlor action. See id. at 538-45. They justify this collateral limitation approach at length, and the strategy seems promising.
Muir and Stein also advocate a direct assault on the settlor/fiduciary doctrine in the form
of an appeal to the courts to treat some plan design decisions, specifically those impacting the
control or disposition of plan assets, as fiduciary acts. Id. at 545-47. The Supreme Court’s
blanket treatment of all plan amendments as non-fiduciary, they argue, “conflates administrative and management decisions, which are referred to in separate clauses of the statutory
definition of fiduciary and were almost certainly intended by Congress to have different
meanings.” Id. at 545. No authority is offered for that clairvoyance, and in this author’s view,
such a distinction between administration and management was almost certainly not
intended by Congress. See Panel 4, supra note 15, at 374 (comments of Robert Nagle) (asserting that congressional staffers drafting the bill could not discern a uniformly recognized
difference in meaning between the terms management and administration, and so, “After we
talked about this endlessly, we decided the heck with it, we’ll just cover all bases.”).
Instead of trying to import a spurious distinction between synonyms, a more promising
path to placing sensible limits on the settlor function doctrine (in this writer’s opinion) would
urge the courts to recognize that certain acts are inherently fiduciary in nature. See supra
note 100.
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flects a property law conceptualization of compensation claims
founded on employee benefit plans.
Employee benefit plans entail an exchange of services—the participant’s labor—for a promise of contingent compensation. The
deferred compensation promised by a pension plan may be expressly
contingent, as when the plan imposes minimum service (vesting
rules) or survival conditions.124 Welfare benefits are necessarily
contingent on the participant or beneficiary experiencing the need
for medical care, disability income, et cetera. In addition, however,
pension and welfare benefits are always implicitly contingent on the
plan sponsor’s right to alter, amend or terminate the program.
ERISA requires that every employee benefit plan be amendable,125
and to the extent of that amendment authority, the plan sponsor’s
apparent obligations are latently revocable.
How far does the plan sponsor’s reserved amendment authority
extend? The central answer, in the case of a pension plan, is given
by the rule that “[t]he accrued benefit of a participant under a plan
may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan.”126 This antireduction (or anti-cutback) rule renders a participant’s interest
under a pension plan irrevocable, but only to the extent of her
accrued benefit.127 The definition of “accrued benefit,” therefore,
functions as a measure of an employee’s protected property right in

124. See ERISA § 203(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (2012) (establishing maximum duration
of forfeitability of accrued benefits derived from employer contributions); ERISA
§ 203(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(A) (permitting forfeiture on death); accord I.R.C.
§ 411(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) (2012) (prescribing corresponding qualified retirement plan rules).
125. ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3).
126. ERISA § 204(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1). The anti-reduction rule is also imposed as
a condition for obtaining favorable tax treatment as a qualified retirement plan. I.R.C.
§ 411(d)(6)(A). It does not apply to welfare plans. ERISA § 201(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1).
In addition, certain amendments that would alter a pension plan’s vesting schedule, as by
extending the period of forfeitability of accrued benefits, are also restricted. ERISA § 203(c)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1053(c)(1); accord I.R.C. § 411(a)(1) (prescribing corresponding qualification
condition). The anti-reduction rule is subject to a few limited exceptions. See infra note 128.
127. As the text implies, not all benefits and features provided under a pension plan fit
within the definition of “accrued benefit,” which generally refers only to retirement-type
benefits and so does not comprehend ancillary benefits such as life insurance or medical
benefits. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(a). Such ancillary benefits reflect the provision of welfaretype benefits under a pension plan. Limiting the definition of accrued benefit to retirementtype benefits ensures that incorporation of welfare benefits under a pension plan does not
change their statutory protection.
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promised deferred compensation.128 No corresponding rule applies
to welfare plans, and indeed the statutory term “accrued benefit”
refers exclusively to pension benefits.129 Hence, an employee’s interest under a welfare plan remains at all times revocable in full except
insofar as (1) all specified conditions on entitlement to benefits have
been satisfied, or (2) the plan sponsor has made a binding commitment to continue the plan into the future.130

128. Most property rights are not absolute, of course (for example, real property zoning
regulation), and Congress has sanctioned a few limited exceptions to the anti-reduction rule.
Although safeguarding the amount of previously earned retirement benefits is fundamental
to retirement security, in exigent circumstances deferred compensation earned in a preceding
plan year may be reduced if funding the additional accrued benefits would impose substantial
business hardship, provided that stringent conditions are satisfied. See ERISA §§ 204(g)(1),
302(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1054(g)(1), 1082(d)(2) (2012 & Supp. IV 2017); accord I.R.C.
§§ 411(d)(6)(A), 412(d)(2) (prescribing corresponding qualified retirement plan rules). Such
funding-based benefit cutbacks can be made only to benefits earned in the plan year
immediately preceding adoption of the amendment, or the preceding two plan years in the
case of a multiemployer plan. ERISA § 302(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(d)(2). Benefit reductions
are also authorized when an underfunded multiemployer pension plan terminates as a result
of mass withdrawals. See ERISA §§ 204(g)(1), 4281, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1054(g)(1), 1441 (2012);
accord I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(A).
The Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 also authorizes, in narrow circumstances
and subject to special procedures, more general benefit reductions. These include reductions
of benefits already in pay status under ongoing but critically underfunded multiemployer
pension plans when that action is necessary to avoid insolvency. ERISA § 305(e)(9), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1085(e)(9) (Supp. IV 2017); I.R.C. § 432(e)(9) (Supp. IV 2017).
129. See ERISA §§ 3(23), (34)-(35), 201(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(23), (34)-(35), 1051(1).
130. The first listed exception refers to accrued but unpaid claims, such as medical
expenses already incurred by an employee participant (or beneficiary) and timely presented
for reimbursement under a health care plan. When all plan conditions have been satisfied, the
employer cannot simply refuse to make payment because the claim is unexpectedly large or
the company is experiencing financial difficulty, for example. The initial claim for AIDS
treatment expenses submitted by McGann illustrates this case; it was presumably paid in full.
See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 405 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991). Once fully performed,
the unilateral offer of welfare benefits becomes a binding contract enforceable against the
employer; it is not an unenforceable promise to make a future gift. However restricted or
evanescent the rights instituted by a welfare plan may be, they establish some legal
entitlement (albeit often minimal or highly contingent) and hence amount to more than a
mere gratuity. But see infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
The second exception acknowledges the possibility that, although the statute does not
demand that welfare plans be continued to cover conditions or expenses not yet incurred, an
employer may nevertheless relinquish the right to call off the program (so-called vesting by
contract), and can thereby establish a robust ongoing entitlement. Such a continuing commitment is not lightly inferred. See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926,
932-35 (2015) (rejecting court of appeals inference of intent to vest retirement benefits for
life); see also infra Part IV.B.
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Many disquieting applications of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine can
be understood as simple examples of the limited scope of ERISA’s
anti-reduction rule. The doctrine’s harsh results can be reframed to
equate a worker’s “property” in pension benefits with his accrued
benefit. These propositions can be illustrated by reference to a few
cases selected from the parade of horrors presented by Muir and
Stein and discussed in the last Section.
A. Pension Benefits
ERISA defines an employee’s accrued benefit as follows:
The term “accrued benefit” means—
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the individual’s accrued benefit determined under the plan and, except as provided
in section 204(c)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3)], expressed in the
form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age,
or
(B) in the case of a plan which is an individual account plan,
the balance of the individual’s account.
The accrued benefit of an employee shall not be less than the
amount determined under section 204(c)(2)(B) [29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(c)(2)(B)] with respect to the employee’s accumulated
contribution.131

Defined benefit plans and individual account plans (defined contribution plans) are by definition pension plans.132 That the accrued
benefit provided by a defined benefit plan is “determined under the
plan” reflects the sponsor’s freedom to set the amount of deferred
compensation. While the statutory definition defers to the plan’s
definition, it is not devoid of content. The focus on the “annual
benefit commencing at normal retirement age” indicates that,
whatever else might be provided under the plan, accrued benefit is
concerned with periodic retirement support payments.133
131. ERISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23); accord I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(A), (D) (prescribing
corresponding definition for tax qualification purposes).
132. See ERISA § 3(34)-(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35); accord I.R.C. § 414(i)-(j) (prescribing
corresponding qualified plan definitions).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(a) (as amended in 2000), provides in part that:
In general, the term “accrued benefits” refers only to pension or retirement
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Accrued benefit contains both qualitative and quantitative components. Quantitatively, accrued benefit is dynamic or time-dependent: the accrued benefit at any time is the total amount of pension
benefits that the employee has earned by the performance of
services up to that time, expressed as an annuity (meaning the
dollar amount to be paid each year starting at normal retirement
age).134 The corresponding definition for a defined contribution
plan—“the balance of the individual’s account”—similarly measures
the total amount of retirement savings accumulated as of a specific
date.135 The accrued benefit of an active participant (current employee covered under the plan) will ordinarily increase with additional
years of service, either by the operation of a service-based benefit
formula under a defined benefit plan or by additional contributions
under a defined contribution plan.136

benefits. Consequently, accrued benefits do not include ancillary benefits not
directly related to retirement benefits such as payment of medical expenses (or
insurance premiums for such expenses), disability benefits not in excess of the
qualified disability benefit (see section 411(a)(9) and paragraph (c)(3) of this
section), life insurance benefits payable as a lump sum, incidental death benefits, current life insurance protection, or medical benefits described in section
401(h).
The foregoing definition is reinforced by the regulation that marks off the scope of the antireduction rule by specifying what are, and are not, “section 411(d)(6) protected benefits.” See
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (1)(a), (d) (as amended in 2012). As observed previously, ancillary benefits amount, in substance, to the inclusion of welfare-type benefits under a pension
plan. See supra note 127. Limiting the application of the anti-reduction rule to retirementtype benefits, rather than all benefits that might be provided under a pension plan, confirms
the inherently contingent and potentially evanescent status of welfare benefits. This limitation is consistent with ERISA’s careful stipulation that a pension plan exists only “to the
extent that” the program either provides retirement income to employees or results in a
deferral of income to the termination of covered employment. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2)(A).
134. ERISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23).
135. See id. Observe, however, that the total earned pension is measured by different
standards: future annual payment amount in the case of a defined benefit plan versus current
accumulated savings under a defined contribution plan. Actuarial conversion between the two
scales is readily accomplished (using interest rates and mortality tables) and frequently
necessary.
136. Under a defined contribution plan, losses and expenses are charged against a
participant’s account and may sometimes exceed contributions and gains for a particular
period, so a decrease in the participant’s accrued benefit is possible. See ERISA § 3(34), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34). That is, employees under a defined contribution plan bear the investment
risk, not the employer, as is the case under a defined benefit plan. See Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999).
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Recall that in Hughes Aircraft the company amended an overfunded contributory defined benefit plan to increase early retirement benefits for one group of employees and to eliminate required
contributions from newly hired workers.137 This disposition of the
surplus, the Court concluded, was an unexceptionable settlor (re)design decision.138 “[P]lan members generally have a non-forfeitable
right only to their ‘accrued benefit,’ so that a plan’s actual investment experience does not affect their statutory entitlement.”139 Even
though the excess was traceable to gains from the investment of
participant contributions,140 because it was a defined benefit plan,
the investment gains (overfunding) did not belong to the employees—it was not their property.141
In Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, Lockheed amended its defined benefit
plan to provide subsidized early retirement benefits and condition
access to the enhanced benefits on the participant’s release of any
employment-related claims against the company.142 The advantage
to the employer did not violate fiduciary obligations (including the
exclusive benefit rule), said the Court, because Lockheed acted as a
settlor when it amended the plan.143 Nor did the plan amendment
reduce the participant’s accrued benefit.144 Rather, without limiting
preexisting pension rights or distribution alternatives, it added a
new option: increased (subsidized) early retirement benefits conditioned on release of employment claims.145
Careful attention to the scope of the anti-reduction rule explains
why there may be nothing in ERISA to stop the employer from
writing the plan to require the employee “to tattoo the corporate
logo onto the employee’s forehead” as a condition on eligibility for
137. See Huges Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 436.
138. See id. at 444.
139. Id. at 440.
140. See id. at 435-36.
141. See id. at 439-41. Upon termination of an overfunded defined benefit pension plan, the
excess assets may be distributed to the employer, provided that the terms of the plan so
provide. See ERISA §§ 403(c)(1), (d)(1), 4044(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(1), (d)(1), 1344(d) (2012
& Supp. III 2016). Such reversions are subject to a special excise tax (at a rate that can be as
high as 50 percent) to recapture tax benefits (deferral) that Congress deemed undeserved. See
I.R.C. § 4980 (2012).
142. 517 U.S. 882, 885 (1996).
143. Id. at 891.
144. See id. at 885.
145. See id.
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benefits.146 Distribution options cannot be retroactively extinguished
because “a plan amendment which has the effect of ... eliminating
or reducing an early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy
(as defined by regulations), or ... eliminating an optional form of
benefit, with respect to benefits attributable to service before the
amendment shall be treated as reducing accrued benefits” in violation of the anti-reduction rule.147 Observe that if such a logo tattoo
requirement were added by plan amendment as a condition on
access to previously earned pension benefits, it would indeed violate
ERISA (specifically the anti-reduction rule, not fiduciary obligations). If instead the tattoo condition were only imposed to determine eligibility for a new distribution option, it would not impair a
participant’s property rights (that is, the amount of or access to
previously accrued benefits). Moreover, it seems perfectly permissible to impose the tattoo requirement prospectively, as an additional
condition on earning additional benefits by the performance of
future services. Despite its effrontery, this eligibility condition
would have been lawful upon initial establishment of the plan,
falling as it does within the design autonomy reserved to the plan
sponsor.148 A pension plan is not required to cover all employees or
any particular group of employees; ERISA only prohibits certain age
and service conditions.149
146. Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 522-23.
147. ERISA § 204(g)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(2) (2012); accord I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(B) (prescribing corresponding qualification condition).
148. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 21, at 18-19.
The pattern of substantive pension regulation deserves special notice. To
preserve a system of voluntary plan sponsorship, Congress trod lightly. Most
matters were left unregulated, including the central design issues of a pension
plan, namely, the extent of workforce coverage and the level of benefits. Where
it chose to regulate, Congress restricted but did not eliminate freedom of
contract. Instead of mandating particular plan features, it set minimum
standards for certain key terms, leaving sponsors the flexibility to exceed the
baseline.
Id. at 210.
149. See ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052; accord I.R.C. § 410(a) (prescribing the corresponding qualification condition).
Even though ERISA would permit a pension plan to require a forehead logo tattoo as an
eligibility condition, most pension plans are designed to qualify for favorable tax treatment,
and the Code demands that the group of workers who benefit under a qualified retirement
plan not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(3), 410(b).
The tattoo eligibility condition also would not violate this tax law relative coverage requirement. The percentage of highly compensated employees (HCEs), see id. § 414(q) (defining
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B. Welfare Benefits
ERISA’s definition of accrued benefit does not speak to welfare
plans.150 Nor is there any corresponding concept or measure of
benefits earned by the performance of services as of a given date.
That’s understandable, inasmuch as most welfare benefits insure
participants or their beneficiaries against the financial impact of
specified conditions, such as health care needs or income loss
attributable to the worker’s disability or death rather than steadily
accumulating savings for future distribution.151 What, then, is the
metric of a participant’s entitlement to benefits—what defines the
participant’s “property”—under a welfare plan?
When it comes to welfare benefits, the only “property” is contract.
Welfare plan benefits may be financed by insurance, but need not
be, nor is advance funding required, so as a formal matter there is
often no trust holding welfare plan assets.152 Functionally of course,
ERISA fiduciary obligations apply to any person having discretionary authority in the management or administration of a welfare
plan, even if unfunded and uninsured.153 In administering the plan,
HCEs), willing to sport a tattoo of the employer’s logo is unlikely to be disproportionately
greater than the share of lower-paid workers who would do so. Consequently, if plan membership were limited to “branded” employees, the qualified plan coverage nondiscrimination
requirement would be unlikely to pose an obstacle. See id. §§ 401(a)(3), 410(b) (imposing coverage nondiscrimination tests as condition on qualified retirement plan tax treatment). If a
logo tattoo were instead required as a condition on eligibility to receive a particular form of
distribution (such as a single-sum payout rather than life annuity), the tax law nondiscrimination rules would not be offended because availability of the restricted optional form of
benefit would not favor HCEs. See id. § 401(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-4 (as amended in
2004).
150. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
151. Promises of future welfare benefits, as under a plan providing post-retirement health
care benefits, are in principle amenable to systematic advance funding, but ERISA does not
require it. See ERISA §§ 3(1), 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1081(a)(1); cf. I.R.C. §§ 419,
419A (limiting tax-advantaged advance funding of certain welfare benefits). Nor is the payout
of pension benefits necessarily certain—a pension plan may call for forfeiture in the event of
the death of an unmarried participant prior to retirement. See ERISA §§ 203(a)(3)(A), 205, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1053(a)(3)(A), 1055; accord I.R.C. §§ 411(a)(3)(A), 401(a)(11), 417 (prescribing
corresponding qualified retirement plan rules). In the case of defined contribution pension
plans (such as 401(k) plans), however, forfeiture on death is virtually unheard of.
152. See ERISA §§ 3(1), 301(a)(1), 403(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1081(a)(1), 1103(b)(1).
If a welfare plan is funded, ERISA mandates that its assets be held in trust. ERISA § 403(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
153. See ERISA §§ 3(21)(A), 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1104(a)(1).

2018]

UNTRUSTWORTHY: ERISA’S ERODED FIDUCIARY LAW

1045

such a fiduciary is just implementing the contract. In the absence
of a collective bargaining agreement, the contract is unilateral: the
employer offers to pay or reimburse specified amounts, subject to
specified conditions, and covered workers (generally at-will employees) accept the deal by performing services. Welfare plan sponsors can and routinely do reserve the right to amend or terminate
the plan at any time for any reason.154 If the plan sponsor has not
made a binding commitment to continue the plan into the future
(the typical case), then an employee’s interest under a welfare plan
remains fully revocable except insofar as all specified conditions on
entitlement to benefits have been satisfied.155 The plan may define
the insured event as expansively or narrowly as the sponsor wishes.
Health care plans, for example, typically promise to pay or reimburse specified medical care costs incurred by a participant or
beneficiary while a participant or beneficiary. They do not ordinarily
cover health care needs that may arise in the future simply because
those needs stem from an injury or disease that occurs while the
individual is a plan participant or beneficiary. Plan liability, in
other words, is keyed to an existing obligation to pay for health care
received; it does not extend to all health care that will be required
to treat a condition originating while one is a participant or beneficiary. The plan sponsor’s ongoing authority to halt the program
allows the employer to retract coverage of future treatments that
will result from a condition or life event that has already happened.
To that extent, welfare benefits are in effect subject to an implicit
condition subsequent.
McGann v. H & H Music Co. illustrates this point.156 There, a
plan amendment that lowered the lifetime cap on health care
benefits from $1 million to $5000 for expenses related to AIDS was
154. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (“Employers or
other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt,
modify, or terminate welfare plans.”). Muir and Stein suggest that the “reference to ‘generally’
might ... be viewed as a bit of hedging, allowing the development of limiting principles on
settlor freedom in subsequent cases.” Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 484 n.151. More likely,
this qualification was included in recognition of the possibility that an employer’s freedom to
amend or terminate a welfare plan is sometimes limited by contract, as in the case of a
collectively bargained plan that unambiguously promises irrevocable rights to future benefits,
such as retiree health care (in other words, vesting by contract). See supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
155. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
156. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
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applied to an employee who had contracted AIDS and whose notification of his employer of that fact triggered the adverse change in
coverage.157 Clearly, no right to medical benefits becomes fixed upon
contracting the disease or condition that gives rise to health care
needs.158 Apparently McGann’s claim for benefits came into being
only as the medical expenses were incurred (goods or services
received), and was subject to plan conditions and limitations in effect at that time, even though his situation had irrevocably changed
for the worse. When the plan was amended, there was no longer
anything McGann could do to avoid the need for costly future
medical care. Moreover, when the events in McGann transpired,
preexisting condition exclusions in health plans and health insurance policies were common and enforceable: McGann likely could
not obtain alternative or supplemental coverage on his own.159
Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp., a case upholding an employer’s
denial of severance pay to induce key engineers to relocate to a
distant facility, provides another example.160 There the plan terms
made payment of severance pay contingent on manager belief that
“the granting of such pay is appropriate.”161 The court considered
the denial of severance pay an appropriate business decision.162 But
the benefit reduction could have been done by plan amendment.163
Severance pay is ordinarily classified as a welfare benefit,164 so here
157. See id. at 403.
158. See id. at 405 (“The right referred to in [ERISA] section 510 is not simply any right
to which an employee may conceivably become entitled.”).
159. Subsequent legislation outlaws the kind of health condition discrimination exemplified
by the plan amendment in McGann and forbids permanent preexisting condition exclusions.
See supra note 95. Even though antidiscrimination and health insurance reform measures
now prevent such cutbacks in health care coverage, the point here is that ERISA does not
generally prohibit such adverse amendments; a legally enforceable (or perfected) claim to
welfare benefits is very narrowly defined.
160. 188 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
161. Id. at 161-62.
162. Id. at 162.
163. In view of the vagueness of its terms (saying, in effect, that we will pay severance if
it seems good for business), the original plan arguably violated ERISA § 402(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b)(4) (2012), which requires that every employee benefit plan specify the basis on
which payments are to be made from the plan. From that standpoint, the business decision
denying severance to engineers who refused to relocate perhaps operated as de facto plan
adoption (rather than amendment) by supplying a central omitted component of plan design.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
164. As applied to severance pay, ERISA’s definitions of pension and welfare plans actually
overlap, but Congress authorized the Labor Department to issue regulations exempting

2018]

UNTRUSTWORTHY: ERISA’S ERODED FIDUCIARY LAW

1047

again affected employees had no accrued benefits protected by the
anti-reduction rule. And unlike in McGann, the workers at least had
some opportunity to adjust their circumstances to the employer’s
revised program.165
Welfare benefits can also be made dependent on plan terms imposing express conditions subsequent. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen illustrates this proposition.166 A self-funded health care plan
sought reimbursement from a participant’s tort recovery of the full
cost of medical care it had paid on behalf of the employee due to
injuries he sustained in an auto accident.167 The plan’s terms called
for reimbursement of amounts paid by the plan “out of any monies
recovered from [a] third party.”168 The company asserted that this
language entitled it to any amounts paid by or on behalf of the negligent driver regardless of the expenses incurred (here, attorney’s
fees) to obtain the payment.169 The plan’s reimbursement clause
operated as a condition subsequent: when triggered it retracted
previous benefit disbursements to the employee. The issue before
the Supreme Court was whether equitable defenses based on principles of unjust enrichment limited the plan’s reimbursement claim.170
While the Court interpreted the plan’s reimbursement language
consistently with the common-fund doctrine, it actually held that
“equitable rules [cannot] override the clear terms of a plan.”171
Consequently, nothing in ERISA would prevent US Airways from
amending its plan to require that in the future a participant in
McCutchen’s position must “pay for the privilege of serving as US
Airways’ collection agent.”172 In other words, with proper drafting
the plan could be written to take back all benefit payments even if

severance programs from pension classification. See ERISA § 3(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B);
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(b) (2017) (generally excusing severance pay plans from pension plan
treatment provided that total payments do not exceed twice the employee’s annual
compensation and payments are completed within twenty-four months after the termination
of the employee’s service).
165. See Noorily, 188 F.3d at 156-57.
166. 569 U.S. 88 (2013).
167. See id. at 92-93.
168. Id. at 92.
169. See id. at 92-93.
170. See id. at 94.
171. Id. at 91.
172. Id. at 105.
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that leaves the participant out-of-pocket for attorney’s fees and
costs!
Reconsider the reduction of the lifetime cap on AIDS-related
health care in this context. Harsh as the McGann result seems,
McCutchen indicates that the result could be harsher still. Although
ordinarily medical benefit claims would be understood to arise as
medical expenses are incurred, with express language in the plan
document the employer could impose repayment obligations that
would hold benefits hostage to still later events. For example, the
plan might be modified to require the employee to repay all benefits
disbursed in the previous year if the employee fails to adhere to a
prescribed treatment, such as smoking cessation for emphysema or
a prescription drug regimen for the treatment of HIV.
In principle, it appears that employers could go even further than
imposing conditions subsequent. A plan might be drafted to expressly disclaim any contractual commitment, declaring the payment of
health or welfare benefits a gratuity.173 By negating any contractual
obligation, the program would merely announce a current intention
to make a future gift, but the promise to make a gift is ordinarily
unenforceable.174 Accordingly, in the welfare plan context the
gratuity theory—which courts in an earlier era invoked to equate a
pension promise with an unenforceable promise to make a gift—
could endure.175 While that’s true in theory, real-world welfare plans
173. Observe that the term “welfare plan” is defined to mean “any plan, fund, or program”
established or maintained to provide specified types of benefits. See ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1) (2012). The existence of a contract is not required. Certain unfunded gratuitous
payments to pre-ERISA retirees are excluded by regulation from the definition of a pension
plan, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(e) (2017), but there is no comparable gratuitous payment exception
to the welfare plan definition.
174. American courts refuse to enforce gratuitous promises not made to charities that have
not induced reliance. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the
World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997); Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitous Promises,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881.
175. The gratuity theory of pensions prevailed before 1938. A series of federal enactments
limited pension plan sponsors’ ability to disclaim liability, eventually prohibiting such
disclaimers altogether for plans subject to ERISA. The major events followed this timeline:
(1) Pre-1938—Pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus trusts could be revoked
and the assets reclaimed by the employer despite having received preferential
income tax treatment, provided that the terms of the plan expressly reserved to
the employer the right to terminate the program and reclaim trust assets at any
time for any reason, see H.R. REP. NO . 75-1860, at 46 (1938);
(2) 1938-1976—Qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus trusts were
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do not go to that extreme to evade responsibility. It is not necessary
to contain costs, and such a declaration does not send the right
message to workers.
To summarize, a participant’s right to a particular type of welfare
benefit does not just depend on the specified event or condition (such
as sickness, accident, disability, or death) befalling the participant
or covered beneficiary. The plan must also continue in force until
the claim for benefits arises according to the terms of the plan, and
there must be no lingering condition subsequent that could trigger
forfeiture of an otherwise-perfected claim.176 Until perfected claim
status is attained, a participant’s interest in welfare benefits may
be contingent virtually to the point of evanescent. While a welfare
plan can be drafted to restrict the employer’s freedom to reduce or
eliminate benefits, commitments of continuing coverage are not the
norm, and the enforceability of such assurances is often highly con-

effectively made irrevocable by enactment of the predecessor to I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(2), Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.75-554, § 165(a)(2), 52 Stat. 447,
518, but such trusts were systematically underfunded and employers routinely
disclaimed liability for any shortfall, see Norman P. Stein, Reversions from
Pension Plans: History, Policies, and Prospects, 44 TAX L. REV. 259, 279-81
(1989);
(3) 1976-1988—ERISA ostensibly outlawed the fund-specific pension promise by
imposing liability on the employer for underfunded guaranteed benefits, but that
liability to the PBGC was capped at 30 percent of the employer’s net worth,
ERISA § 4062(b);
(4) 1988-present—Employer liability extended to all members of controlled group
and cap repealed, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100203, § 9312(b)(2)(A), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-361.
Observe that the final two phases of this evolution apply only to private pension plans subject
to ERISA. Pension plans that are governmental plans or church plans can still disclaim
liability for unfunded benefits. See ERISA §§ 3(32)-(33), 4(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32)-(33),
1003(b); Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (2017) (holding
that the church plan exemption applies broadly to plans maintained by related religiously
affiliated tax-exempt charitable organizations, such as hospitals and schools). And of course
advance funding is not required of welfare plans. ERISA § 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1).
176. While reimbursement obligations (subrogation rights) were the focus in McCutchen,
see supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text, the most common condition subsequent is the
requirement of filing a timely claim for benefits (or proof of loss). See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031(b)(2)-(3) (stating that plans must maintain reasonable procedures for filing claims, including
notification of applicable time frames, and must not contain any provision or be administered
in a way that unduly inhibits or hampers the initiation or processing of benefit claims); see
also id. § 2520.102-3(l), (s) (providing information required in the summary plan description
concerning loss of benefits and procedures governing filing claims for benefits).
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tested.177 A promise of welfare benefits, in other words, is ordinarily
for the time being only. Assurances that the program will be
available to address future needs are typically “no better than the
aggregate of an employer’s decency and solvency.”178
Looking to the private trust analogy, a participant’s interest in
welfare plan benefits is ordinarily comparable in its (lack of) robustness to the interest of a beneficiary in the assets of a revocable inter
vivos trust that designates the settlor as sole trustee (a declaration
of trust). The trust beneficiary’s interest may be extinguished
without liability at any moment at the whim of the settlor, but could
ripen into future financial advantage by default, should the settlor
fail to revoke before distribution is required by the trust’s terms.
Trust law recognizes such a tenuous interest and treats it as
equitable property,179 even though it has no greater substance than
a potential devisee’s interest under a will during the life of the
testator, an interest generally treated as a mere expectancy and not
entitled to legal protection.180 In contrast, a participant’s interest in
pension plan benefits is, to the extent of accrued benefits (and only
to that extent), comparable to the interest of a beneficiary in the
assets of an irrevocable trust. Non-pension benefits (frequently
called ancillary benefits)181 and other rights and features promised
under a pension plan, however, are just as susceptible to the

177. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 21, at 70-74, 93-98.
178. See Norman Stein, An Article of Faith: The Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux
Church Plans, A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/news
letter/groups/labor_law/ebc_newsletter/14_sum_ebc_news/faith.html [https://perma.cc/ 9WKCPRZY]. The quoted passage actually refers to the gratuity theory of pensions, by which courts
in the early twentieth century treated the unregulated and largely unfunded pension plans
of that era as unenforceable promises to make gifts. Id. The theory still retains some force
with respect to church plans, to which ERISA does not apply. See supra note 175.
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. § 57 & cmt. h (AM . LAW INST . 1959); IA AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.6 (4th ed. 1987).
180. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1
cmt. d (AM . LAW INST. 1999) (stating that before the death of the property owner “a potential
heir has no property interest but merely an ‘expectancy’ (an inchoate interest) in the
decedent’s intestate estate”). But see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 315-316 (AM . LAW
INST. 1940) (noting that a court of equity would enforce the relinquishment or transfer for fair
consideration of an expectant distributee’s interest in property (as potential heir, devisee, or
legatee), even though such a transfer was historically ineffective at law).
181. See supra note 133; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-4(e)(2) (as amended in 2004)
(defining ancillary benefits for purposes of qualified plan nondiscrimination testing).
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employer’s withdrawal or unilateral alteration as welfare plan
benefits.
The ultimate economic origin of a worker’s claim to employee
benefits (whether accrued pension benefits or welfare benefits, and
whether or not collectively bargained) lies in the labor contract: the
provision of services in exchange for contingent compensation.
Recall that a participant’s “accrued benefit” is at base “determined
under the plan.”182 The settlor function doctrine accords the plan
sponsor freedom to set or revise the terms of that contract free of the
fiduciary obligation to act “solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries.”183 But the anti-reduction rule and contract law
still operate to prevent retroactive elimination of accrued pension
benefits and perfected welfare benefit claims (respectively).184 These
constraints in effect recognize that sufficient performance by a
participating employee generates a limited species of property in
employee benefits. The contours of that property are set by the
terms of the plan, which can be altered prospectively but cannot,
according to the property perspective, be revised retroactively to the
worker’s detriment. Or can they be? Plan terms frequently require
interpretation. Who does the interpreting?
IV. PROPERTY REDEFINITION BY INTERPRETATION: THE NEW
GRATUITY THEORY
Under the settlor function doctrine the plan sponsor has unilateral control over plan design, apart from reducing accrued pension
benefits or repudiating perfected welfare benefit claims. The exceptions mean that detrimental design changes cannot be applied
retrospectively. Yet insofar as the employer controls plan interpretation, even these defenses may be breached: benefit rights earned by
prior service (accrued pension benefits or perfected welfare claims)
may be subjected to retroactive trimming and adjustment. Careful
analysis of federal courts’ handling of plan interpretation questions
reveals a formally neutral methodology dominated in practice by the
plan sponsor. Instead of enforcing the deal as workers are given to

182. ERISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (2012); see supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
183. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
184. See supra notes 127, 133, 147, 176 and accompanying text.
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understand it, courts now privilege as contract the employer-controlled formal plan document, and that control is generally extended
to encompass questions of interpretation.185 Today, an employee
benefit plan is scarcely more than what the employer’s lawyers say
it is, which may be markedly different than what the employer told
workers to expect.
A. Employer Primacy
“Courts construe ERISA plans, as they do other contracts, by
‘looking to the terms of the plan’ as well as to ‘other manifestations
of the parties’ intent.’”186 Invoking this principle, the Court has
supplemented the language of the plan document by resort to
“background legal rules ... that typically or traditionally have governed a given situation when no agreement states otherwise.”187
Background rules incorporated by default have included the
equitable common-fund doctrine, used as an aid to interpreting a
health plan provision calling for reimbursement out of any monies
recovered from a third-party tortfeasor,188 and the notice-prejudice
rule of state insurance law, applied to determine whether a claim
for benefits under an insured disability plan was timely.189 This
effort to understand plan terms evenhandedly by reference to “the
parties’ intent” is far less than it seems, because the Court has
endorsed approaches to plan interpretation that are decidedly—and
often decisively—employer-centric. For employer-instituted plans,
a strong convention of employer primacy in plan interpretation
emerges from four strands of ERISA jurisprudence.
First, the Court equates the “terms of the plan” with the language
of the plan document.190 The parties’ (plural) intent, in other words,
185. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 435-38 (2011) (refusing to treat the summary plan description—a communication mandated by Congress to facilitate workers’ career
and financial planning by providing them with accessible, understandable, and actionable
information about the major features of the benefit program—as setting the core terms of the
deal).
186. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 102 (2013) (quoting Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989)).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 103.
189. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 364, 375-76 (1999).
190. See CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 436-38.
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is not used to define the central features of the benefit program
(that is, the essential components of the deal) by taking into account
the understanding of employees as well as the employer. Instead,
“other manifestations of the parties’ intent” come into play only
when necessary to put into effect the often technical and generally
undisclosed language of the formal plan document.191 The employer
typically exercises almost complete control over the language of a
benefit plan that is not the product of collective bargaining,192 and
so the interpretive exercise ordinarily focuses on the meaning of
terms adopted unilaterally by the employer to serve its purposes.
Second, if the plan document expressly grants the fiduciary
discretion to interpret the terms of the plan, then those interpretations are not second-guessed by the courts.193 Instead of independently determining the meaning of plan language (de novo review),
the court will set aside the fiduciary’s reading only if it is found to
be an abuse of discretion.194 The courts give effect to that restricted
scope of review rather than disregarding it as a prohibited exculpatory clause.195 Moreover, that limited scope of judicial review applies
even if the fiduciary is a company insider whose reading of the plan
191. Upon written request and payment of a reasonable charge for copying, a plan
participant or beneficiary is entitled to be furnished a copy of the plan document, the key
instrument “under which the plan is established or operated.” ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(4) (2012). The summary plan description (SPD), a mandatory disclosure vehicle,
serves as the generally available source of information on plan terms, but it does not supply
“the terms of the plan.” CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 438. The Court cited this proposition in
McCutchen, a subsequent case that had been litigated in the lower courts under the assumption that the interpretation of the SPD controlled the outcome. McCutchen, 569 U.S. at 92 n.1.
The language of the plan itself surfaced only when the controversy was before the Supreme
Court. See id. Given that posture, the Court treated the language of the SPD as if it supplied
the terms of the plan, but took pains to note the parties’ oversight. See id.
192. Although the accrued benefit anti-reduction rule prohibits amendments that would
reduce the amount of previously earned pension benefits or materially restrict distribution
options applicable to those benefits, such detrimental changes can be imposed prospectively
(that is, applied to benefits to be earned by future service). See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
193. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
194. See id.; infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text. In McCutchen, the Court construed
the plan (actually the SPD, see supra note 191) reimbursement obligation independently (de
novo), apparently because (in another litigation oversight) US Airways failed to argue that
the plan granted the administrator “sole discretion to determine all matters relating to
interpretation and operation of the Plan.” Joint Appendix at 18, US Airways, Inc. v.
McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88 (2013) (No. 11-1285), 2012 WL 3758081.
195. See infra note 283.
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might be influenced by a conflict of interest.196 Reluctance to disturb
judgment calls by a conflicted insider fiduciary absent compelling
evidence of impropriety—abuse of discretion with deference,
effectively indulging a strong presumption of good faith—renders a
fiduciary’s employer-regarding reading of plan terms nearly unimpeachable. And because interpretation is by nature retrospective, a
restrictive reading of a pension plan’s benefit formula effectively
revises the plan’s definition of accrued benefit and applies that
understanding to benefits attributable to all prior service, thereby
impacting the financial consequences of events that occurred long
before the interpretation crystallized. The result can be dramatic,
and could not be achieved by the amendment of a pension plan,
because such a change would offend the accrued benefit antireduction rule.197
Third, the limited scope of review accorded plan interpretations
by a discretion-clad insider fiduciary is reinforced by the settlor
function doctrine. Founded as it is on the analogy between an
employee benefit plan and a private trust, the doctrine brings to
196. See infra Part V.B.1.
197. Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010), illustrates the sometimes-startling
consequences of this limited judicial oversight. There, the Xerox pension plan provided that
if an employee who left the company and took distribution of his accrued benefit were later
rehired, his pension on eventual retirement would be computed under the plan’s benefit
formula by taking into account all years of service with the company, and then applying an
offset to account for the distribution received on the earlier separation from service. See id.
at 509-10. The plan failed to specify how this offset would be computed, but did expressly
grant the administrator, a company insider, discretion to interpret the plan. See id. at 509-10,
512. Affected participants argued that the plan should be interpreted to limit the offset to the
nominal dollar amount of the lump sum distribution received on separation from service,
while the administrator sought to apply an offset increased by the time value of money. Id.
at 510-11. The difference, as Justice Breyer demonstrated in an appendix to his dissenting
opinion, could easily impact annual retirement payments by a factor of five or greater. Id. at
540-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that the participant’s plan would award $3500 annuity
versus $690 under the administrator’s approach). The case is analyzed at length in Part
V.B.1, because it is the foundation for flexible application of ERISA’s duty of loyalty, which
amounts to implicit exculpation. For comparison, in Cottillion v. United Refining Co. the
employer argued that Frommert required deference to an insider administrator’s plan
reinterpretation. 781 F.3d 47, 55 (3d Cir. 2015). That interpretation called for actuarial
reduction to pensions commencing before age sixty-five, which would have required certain
early retirees to repay a large share of pension payments already received. See id. at 51-52.
The Cottillion court held this “reinterpretation” of the plan’s definition of benefits was so far
removed from the plan language—which said nothing about actuarial reduction for the
workers in question—that it amounted to a plan amendment that violated the accrued benefit
anti-reduction rule. See id. at 57-58.
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mind the image of donative wealth transfers. That image suggests
that an employee benefit plan is more akin to a unilateral
conveyance—like a deed, a gift in trust, or a will—than it is like a
contract, the meaning of which must be determined by examining
the understanding of both parties. The settlor function cases, along
with many other high court ERISA pronouncements, invite resort
to private trust law as the model of legal relations.198 That subconscious paradigm molds the judicial point of view in subtle but
momentous ways, insinuating a psychology of magnanimity, paternalism, and dependency. Once the employer is conceived as the sole
settlor of a private trust, it is natural to interpret plan terms to
carry out the “donor’s intent” so as to best effectuate the apparently
gratuitous transfer. This mode of thinking extends the employer’s
control over plan terms to employer control over the interpretation
of plan terms, according supremacy to the employer-settlor’s intent.
The settlor function doctrine habituates and naturalizes the private trust analogy: the comparison implies that in determining the
meaning of plan terms, the employer’s purpose ought to govern; the
contributions (labor) and understanding of employees need not
inform the decision. In the realm of plan interpretation, the
discredited gratuity theory still holds sway, even in construing
pension promises.199 At minimum, the settlor function doctrine and
the private trust analogy encourage deference to the employer’s
interpretation of a plan that was not collectively bargained.
The private trust analogy tends to elide the contract dimension
of employee benefit plans. Years ago, Professors Fischel and Langbein explained the economic reality that a sponsoring employer and
its participating employees function as co-settlors of a benefit plan,
whether or not the plan calls for employee contributions.200 They
noted that, even if the employer writes all the checks,
these benefits are not free to employees. Employees pay for
pension benefits in the form of lower wages. Thus, employees
will bargain for plans only if the benefits anticipated exceed the
198. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996); Conkright, 559 U.S. at
512-13; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct.
1823, 1828 (2015); see also Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014).
199. See supra note 175.
200. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 27, at 1117.
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income foregone. In this vital sense, each employee is, together
with the employer, the settlor of his own pension and benefit
plans.201

Despite mutual advantages founded in employment, the Court has
never suggested that participants should be treated as co-settlors.
Indeed, it has passed over invitations to so analyze employee benefit
plans.202
Cost concerns are the fourth factor militating in favor of employer
primacy on questions of plan interpretation. When interpreting
ERISA’s fiduciary duties, the Supreme Court instructs that “the law
of trusts often will inform, but will not necessarily determine” the
question.203
In some instances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after
which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the
language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require
departing from common-law trust requirements. And, in doing
so, courts may have to take account of competing congressional
purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other,
its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.204

201. Id. (footnotes omitted).
202. Recently, the Court was squarely presented with a trust law argument founded on
participants’ status as co-settlors. The case involved a challenge to the prudence of continued
investment in employer stock by an employee stock ownership plan. See Dudenhoeffer, 134
S. Ct. at 2464. Respondents and their amici asserted that under traditional trust law
principles defined contribution plan participants should be recognized as co-settlors. As such,
in the event that the employer’s financial health declines precipitously and unforeseeably,
participants’ objectives must be taken into account in assessing the propriety of continued
investment in employer stock. See Brief for Respondents at 35-36, Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014) (No. 12-751) (citing Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Trust Variation and ERISA’s “Presumption of Prudence,” 142 TAX NOTES 1205 (2014)); Brief for Law
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 25-26, Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014) (No. 12-751) (citing Wiedenbeck, supra). The opinion
made no mention of the co-settlor line of analysis and decided the case on other grounds. See
Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2463.
203. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 497.
204. Id.
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In principle this approach seems sufficiently nuanced to be adaptable to ERISA’s multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives. In
recent practice, however, the Court has repeatedly invoked Congress’s alleged “desire not to create a system that is so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage
employers from offering ... benefit plans in the first place” while
paying little heed to the desire to protect employee benefits.205 In the
context of plan interpretation, prioritization of (or obsession with)
cost concerns generally aligns with and buttresses the employer’s
reading, because reducing indirect compensation costs (plan administration and litigation expenses) increases profits.
In summary, employer-observant readings of the plan document
can rarely be set aside. If the plan is not collectively bargained, the
employer maintains unilateral control over plan terms under the
settlor function doctrine. Hence, the inclusion of a provision (initially or by amendment) granting fiduciaries discretion to interpret the
plan is accepted, and that discretion brings with it the limited
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Moreover, in conducting
abuse-of-discretion review judicial monitoring is further relaxed by
granting deference to the fiduciary’s judgment calls. That deference
flows from several sources. In the case of the insider fiduciary,
ERISA’s tolerance of conflicted fiduciaries is taken to imply a
presumption of regularity and good faith (implicit exculpation). But
in addition, the employer maintaining a benefit plan is likened (by
the settlor function doctrine) to the sole settlor of a private trust,
and that analogy suggests that plan terms should be interpreted to
best effectuate the donor’s intent—translated in this context as
meaning the employer-settlor’s intent. Lastly, judicial deference to
employer-friendly readings of the plan gains further support from
the Supreme Court’s heightened sensitivity to the importance of
controlling plan administration and litigation expenses.

205. Id. The Court has quoted Varity’s cost concern language on multiple occasions. See M
& G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933 (2015); Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 612 (2013); Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517
(2010). To date, the Court has quoted Varity’s employee protection language in only two cases,
and in both of those cases Justice Breyer, who wrote for the majority in Varity, authored the
Court’s opinion. See Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2470; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S.
105, 114 (2008).
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It is noteworthy that the foregoing analysis is informed at
virtually every step along the way by the trust law analogy. Things
could have been different. Viewed as a contract, a benefit plan that
is not the product of collective bargaining is in effect a unilateral
contract: an offer accepted by the performance of services.206 As
such, ambiguities would be resolved against the employer who
drafted the document.207 That is, the courts might have resorted to
the rule of contra proferentem, as state courts commonly do in the
interpretation of insurance contracts.208 In fact, many federal district and appellate court ERISA opinions discuss the rule. Further,
most circuits have adopted the rule for cases subject to de novo
review, though not for cases in which a grant of discretion triggers
the abuse-of-discretion standard.209 As will be shown, plans today
routinely include a provision giving the administrator discretion to
interpret the plan’s terms.210
B. “[Extra-]Ordinary Contract Principles”
An employer-centric conceptualization of benefit plans is exemplified by Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in M & G Polymers
USA, LLC v. Tackett, which involved the interpretation of a retiree
health care plan.211

206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. a (AM . LAW INST. 1981).
207. See id. § 206.
208. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM , DISTRIBUTING RISK 101-32 (1986).
209. See, e.g., Porter v. Lowe’s Cos., Inc.’s Bus. Travel Accident Ins. Plan, 731 F.3d 360, 365
& n.13 (5th Cir. 2013); Becker v. Chrysler LLC Health Care Benefits Plan, 691 F.3d 879, 890
(7th Cir. 2012); Carden v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 559 F.3d 256, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding
contra proferentem inapplicable when an administrator has interpretive discretion even if the
administrator is subject to a conflict of interest); Mitzel v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 351 F. App’x
74, 81-82 (6th Cir. 2009); Scruggs v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 585 F.3d 1356, 1366 (10th Cir.
2009); Stamp v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 84, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2008); White v. Coca-Cola
Co., 542 F.3d 848, 857 (11th Cir. 2008); Fay v. Oxford Health Plan, 287 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2d
Cir. 2002); Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1995); Curcio v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 1994). Some circuits further limit the
application of contra proferentem to cases involving insurance companies. See, e.g., Hughes
v. Bos. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1994); Lee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Ala., 10 F.3d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1994).
210. See infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
211. 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015).

2018]

UNTRUSTWORTHY: ERISA’S ERODED FIDUCIARY LAW

1059

Welfare benefits plans must be “established and maintained
pursuant to a written instrument,” [ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29
U.S.C.] § 1102(a)(1), but “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are
generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to
adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans,” Curtiss-Wright Corp.
v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 131 L.Ed.2d
94 (1995). As we have previously recognized, “[E]mployers have
large leeway to design disability and other welfare plans as they
see fit.” Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822,
833, 123 S. Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003). And, we have observed, the rule that contractual “provisions ordinarily should be
enforced as written is especially appropriate when enforcing an
ERISA [welfare benefits] plan.” Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. —, —, 134 S. Ct. 604, 611-612, 187
L.Ed.2d 529 (2013). That is because the “focus on the written
terms of the plan is the linchpin of a system that is not so
complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly
discourage employers from offering [welfare benefits] plans in
the first place.” Id., at —, 134 S. Ct., at 612 (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citation omitted).212

Here we observe the confluence of: (1) the settlor function doctrine
(in the quote from Curtiss-Wright); (2) the identification of the plan
with the written plan document; and (3) the elevation of administrative cost concerns to paramount importance, to the exclusion of all
other ERISA policies, which go unmentioned. Benefit plans are to
be “enforced as written” rather than as publicized and reasonably
understood. In isolation this encapsulated summary of unilateral
control—the new gratuity theory—seems to lay the groundwork for
acceptance of the employer’s reading. And so it did. Yet remarkably,
the plan at issue in M & G Polymers was collectively bargained,213
and so the employer was not free to modify or terminate the plan at
will!
The specific interpretive issue before the Court in M & G Polymers was whether retirees were entitled to lifetime contribution-free
healthcare benefits under a pension and insurance agreement that
their union had negotiated with the company, in which the benefit
agreement was ambiguous on the duration of retiree healthcare
212. Id. at 933 (all except first alteration in original).
213. Id. at 930.
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coverage.214 The Sixth Circuit had found for the plaintiffs, ruling
that retirees were entitled to lifetime employer-provided healthcare
coverage, but allowing reasonable adjustments in their coverage
(such as imposition of co-pays and deductibles) to accommodate
increased costs.215 The Supreme Court, asserting that “[w]e interpret collective-bargaining agreements, including those establishing
ERISA plans, according to ordinary principles of contract law,”
vacated the judgment below and remanded the case.216 It concluded
that the Sixth Circuit had mistakenly relied on a set of inferences
supporting vesting of retiree health benefits that were drawn from
an earlier case, International Union, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.217
As an initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary contract
principles by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested
retiree benefits in all collective-bargaining agreements. That
rule has no basis in ordinary principles of contract law. And it
distorts the attempt “to ascertain the intention of the parties.”218

In effect, the majority accused the Court of Appeals of treating the
Yard-Man inferences as erecting a presumption of vested retiree
healthcare absent explicit durational language in the agreement.219
After repudiating Yard-Man, the majority opinion offered some
guidance on “ordinary contract principles.”220 That guidance, however, seriously distorts the prevailing modern approach to handling
ambiguity or omission in a contract. Professor Robert Hillman convincingly demonstrates that the majority’s “discussion and application of ‘ordinary contract principles’ was quite amateurish” and is
destined to perpetuate confusion in contract interpretation.221 While
agreeing that the durational inferences drawn from Yard-Man do
214. Id.
215. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, LLC, 733 F.3d 589, 600-01 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated,
135 S. Ct. 926 (2015).
216. M & G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 930, 933.
217. Id. at 933-36 (citing Int’l Union, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir.
1983)).
218. Id. at 935 (quoting 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:2, at 18 (4th ed. 2017)).
219. See id. at 935-36.
220. See id. at 936-37.
221. Robert A. Hillman, The Supreme Court’s Application of “Ordinary Contract Principles”
to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree Healthcare Benefits: Perpetuating the Interpretation/Gap-Filling Quagmire, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299, 300 (2017).
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not support a presumption in favor of lifetime retiree healthcare
coverage, Professor Hillman shows that the inferences should not be
rejected out-of-hand.222 Instead, they are relevant to the issue of
coverage duration, and they provided sufficiently probative evidence
to submit the question to the trier of fact.223 Worse, the majority
opinion seems to endorse a presumption of its own, that “when a
contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may
not infer that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life.”224
The majority’s proffered “ordinary contract principles” are an
incomplete and arbitrary selection and are so abstract that they are
not much help at all.225 Moreover, the Court’s resort to ascertaining
the “intention of the parties”226 as the touchstone for contract
interpretation slights the modern objective approach to interpretation, by which courts seek a reasonable interpretation of the
language rather than hunting for subjective meaning.227 Hillman
argues that M & G Polymers is better analyzed as a case in which
the parties never reached agreement on the durational issue.228
Instead of focusing on intentions, he suggests the Court should have
concentrated on alternative approaches to filling the gap.229 From
that perspective, the Sixth Circuit’s decision is shown to be plausi222. See id. at 309-10.
223. Id. at 310.
224. M & G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 937; see Hillman, supra note 221, at 308 (“By ruling out
the use of Yard-Man inferences to prove the parties intended benefits to last for life, the Court
created a bit of a mystery on what the Sixth Circuit was to do on remand to review the case
‘under the correct legal principles.’” (quoting M & G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 937)).
225. See Hillman, supra note 221, at 314-15.
226. M & G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 935 (quoting 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30.2, at 18
(4th ed. 2017)).
227. See Hillman, supra note 221, at 310-11.
228. Id. at 315.
229. Id. at 315-20. Another scholar suggests that the ambiguity was deliberate and served
both parties’ interests. The employer and union in M & G Polymers negotiated a “cap letter”
setting maximum employer contributions toward retiree health costs in order to control the
liability required to be reported pursuant to FIN . ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD ., STATEMENT
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO . 106; EMPLOYERS’ ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIRE MENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (1990), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/
DocumentPage?cid=1218220123671&acceptedDisclaimer=true [https://perma.cc/W6RN-RK
V2]. The caps apparently were not disclosed to participants in the summary plan description
or otherwise. Maria O’Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for Post-Employment
Healthcare, 36 PACE L. REV. 317, 339 (2016) (quoting a union official who testified at trial that
“the company representatives could not say publically [sic] that there would never be retiree
contributions because the accountants would then not certify the FASB statements”).
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ble, and “arguably provided the fairest solution” to the
controversy.230
In the realm of collectively bargained benefit plans, unilateral
employer modification of terms is not possible, and interpretations
that take account of only the employer’s intent would seem correspondingly inappropriate. Yet even here, in the setting of a clear
bilateral agreement, the Court’s approach to plan interpretation
betrays a sort of employer-friendly ERISA exceptionalism. As
applied to employee benefit plans, M & G Polymers endorses a set
of “ordinary contract principles” that is really quite extraordinary.
As a cost-conscious, employer-deferential version of trust law
emerged in ERISA jurisprudence, the trend was accompanied by the
suppression and distortion of contract norms.
The interpretive approaches canvassed here lend credence to the
characterization of a worker’s interest in employee benefits as “weak
property.” Returning to an earlier comparison, an employee’s interest under an employer-instituted (that is, not collectively bargained)
welfare plan was shown to be analogous to a beneficiary’s interest
in a revocable inter vivos private trust administered by the
settlor.231 While technically property, its substance amounts to little
more than a hope of eventual gain, a hope that depends on both the
settlor’s future financial circumstances and continuance in the
settlor’s good graces. In light of the fragility of a beneficiary’s rights
under such a revocable trust, it may be unsurprising that a worker’s
interest in welfare benefits remains vulnerable to both revision and
reinterpretation. Perhaps it is surprising that an employee’s
interest in accrued pension benefits remains subject to the
employer-settlor’s interpretation. The analogy to a beneficiary of an
irrevocable private trust is imperfect: the proper comparison is to
the rights of a beneficiary under an irrevocable private trust, the
terms of which appoint the settlor as sole trustee and expressly
grant the trustee wide latitude to interpret its provisions.232

230. Hillman, supra note 221, at 320.
231. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text. The analogy holds as well for an
employee’s interest in welfare-type (ancillary) benefits provided under a pension plan.
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. § 187 & cmts. j-k (AM . LAW INST. 1959); see also
id. §§ 170 cmt. t, 222 (explaining that, notwithstanding exculpatory provision and broad grant
of discretion, a trustee must act in good faith).
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The breadth of the settlor function doctrine—or more precisely,
the minimal brake on the plan sponsor’s amendment authority—narrowly confines the range of operation of ERISA’s fiduciary
regime. Insofar as benefits attributable to prior service remain
subject to trimming and adjustment at the behest of the employer
under the guise of plan interpretation, that power to redefine
property further restricts the scope of ERISA’s protections. For a
plan that is not the product of collective bargaining, the employer’s
interpretive primacy often borders on hegemony, and even under
collectively bargained benefit plans the employer’s understanding
is accorded special weight.
The restricted scope of ERISA fiduciary law establishes one dimension of employee benefits. That narrow scope supports characterization of workers’ claims as weak property. Still to be considered
is the intensity or strictness of fiduciary obligations in the limited
domain in which they apply. Exploration of that dimension reveals
a fundamental dissonance or disconnect between an uncompromising law on the books233 and a seriously compromised law in action.234
V. PROPERTY PROTECTION: EXCULPATION
A. Express Exculpation
ERISA’s general standards of fiduciary conduct were derived from
private trust law.235 There are four major imperatives: (1) the exclusive benefit rule, which is based on the trust law duty of loyalty;236
(2) the prudence requirement, which follows the trust law duty of
reasonable care;237 (3) the diversification rule, which under state
233. See infra Part V.A.
234. See infra Part V.B.
235. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996).
236. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF
TRS. § 78 (AM . LAW INST. 2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. § 170(1) (AM . LAW INST.
1959). The language of ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule tracks a long-standing condition on obtaining preferential tax treatment applicable to pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus
plans. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (2012) (requiring that a qualified trust instrument must make it
“impossible, at any time prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to employees and
their beneficiaries under the trust, for any part of the corpus or income to be ... used for, or
diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries”).
237. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS. § 77;
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trust law is a specific application or corollary of the general duty of
reasonable care;238 and (4) a requirement that the fiduciary act in
accordance with plan documents, insofar as they are consistent with
the requirements of ERISA.239 The latter requirement is particularly
revealing. It negates plan terms that would override statutory obligations, regardless of whether the program provides pension or welfare benefits. A plan fiduciary’s obligation to discharge her duties
“in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan” extends only “insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with the provisions” of ERISA.240 Furthermore, “any
provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve
a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility,
obligation, or duty under [ERISA’s fiduciary regime] shall be void as
against public policy.”241 That directive deliberately rejects a wellestablished doctrine of traditional trust law that ordinarily gives
effect to exculpatory provisions—terms of a trust relieving the
trustee of liability for breach of trust.242 Unlike state trust law,
ERISA’s regulatory agenda goes beyond establishing an enabling set
of default rules;243 Congress meant to impose mandatory minimum
standards. This uncompromising aspect of federal fiduciary law

RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. § 174.
238. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C). In certain circumstances an ESOP,
profit-sharing plan, or stock bonus plan is permitted to invest heavily in employer securities
or employer real estate notwithstanding the diversification rule (or the prudence requirement,
to the extent that it would require diversification). See ERISA §§ 404(a)(2), 407(d)(3)-(6), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(2), 1107(d)(3)-(6). In plan years beginning after 2006, defined contribution
plan participants must in some cases be allowed to direct the plan to switch their account
investments from employer securities to diversified investment options. See ERISA § 204(j),
29 U.S.C. § 1054(j); accord I.R.C. § 401(a)(35); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS. § 90(a)-(b);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS.: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(b) (AM . LAW INST . 1992);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. § 228.
239. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS.
§ 76(1) & cmt. b(1).
240. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
241. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a).
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. § 222. Exculpatory terms in private trust agreements are not permitted to relieve the trustee from liability for actions committed in bad
faith, and they are strictly construed. Id. §§ 174 cmt. d, 222(2) & cmts. a-b; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS . § 96; GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT , THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 542 (rev. 2d ed. 1993); SCOTT & FRATCHER , supra note 179, §§ 222,
222.3.
243. See generally Langbein, supra note 20.

2018]

UNTRUSTWORTHY: ERISA’S ERODED FIDUCIARY LAW

1065

unnerved plan sponsors and benefits experts in the immediate
aftermath of the statute’s enactment.244
To understand the force of federal fiduciary obligations, the pertinent question is how great a hindrance to ERISA’s commands or
objectives some plan provision must present for a court to conclude
that it is not “consistent” with ERISA. Direct negation of a statutory
obligation is obviously a nullity, but ERISA embodies multiple
policies that do not always live in harmony, such as the goal of
providing greater protection to employee benefits and the desire to
promote sponsorship by preserving wide latitude for employer
autonomy.245 The capaciousness of the realm of “consistent” plan
terms is not yet well defined, but a 2014 Supreme Court decision
involving an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) provides
important guidance.246
ESOPs are defined contribution pension plans designed to invest
primarily in stock of the employer corporation.247 They are expressly
exempted from ERISA’s general fiduciary duty to diversify plan
investments “so as to minimize the risk of large losses,” and are
correspondingly excused from the prudence requirement, but “only
to the extent that it requires diversification.”248 Concentrated investment in stock of the employer corporation inherently brings with it
high risk, but the limited exception to the prudence requirement
implies that in some situations the risk is simply unacceptable—
that investment in employer stock can become per se imprudent.
The dramatic fall in stock prices that accompanied the 2008
financial crisis triggered a spate of ERISA suits charging that ESOP
fiduciaries breached their obligation to act prudently when, faced
with negative information about economic conditions or the health
of the employer, they either continued to buy company stock for the
plan or declined to sell shares already owned. In response to such
“stock drop” fiduciary breach claims, the courts of appeals developed
a presumption that ESOP fiduciaries investing in company stock act
244. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
245. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
246. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014).
247. ERISA § 407(d)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (2012); accord I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (2012);
Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2463.
248. See ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(C), (a)(2), 407(d)(3), (d)(6), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(C), (a)(2),
1107(d)(3), (d)(6) (providing diversification exceptions for ESOPs and other eligible individual
account plans); accord I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7)-(8), 409(l) (providing tax law definition of ESOP).
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prudently, which could be overcome only by evidence showing that
the employer’s viability as a going concern was in serious
jeopardy.249 Dudenhoeffer examined this fiduciary-friendly “presumption of prudence” and resoundingly rejected it.250
Conceding that ERISA’s duty of prudence is in some tension with
a statutorily expressed interest in encouraging ESOPs,251 the Court
rejected both the lower court’s presumption of prudence and the
reconciliation strategies advanced by the employer fiduciaries.252 In
rejecting compromise solutions that would overtly relax ERISA’s
duty of care, the Dudenhoeffer opinion contains important lessons
about (1) the effectiveness of exculpatory language in the plan document, and implicitly (2) the limits of the settlor function doctrine.
The employer argued that ERISA’s specification of the duty of
care, which refers to “the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims,” incorporates in the case of an ESOP the goal of
promoting worker ownership.253 The Court interpreted the “enterprise” or “aims” to refer to the sort of financial benefits which the
plan was established to provide—retirement income in the case of
a pension plan (of which the ESOP is a special type).254 Hence a
249. See, e.g., White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 714 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2013); Pfeil v. State
St. Bank & Tr. Co., 671 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2012); In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128
(2d Cir. 2011); Quan v. Comput. Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2010); Edgar v. Avaya, Inc.,
503 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2007); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995); Moench v.
Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995). Moench was the first in this line of cases (indeed, the
presumption of prudence was sometimes called the Moench presumption). See, e.g., Quan, 623
F.3d at 877. The conceptual origins of the presumption, which was drawn from the administrative deviation doctrine of private trust law, are critically examined in Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Trust Variation and ERISA’s ‘Presumption of Prudence,’ 142 TAX NOTES 1205 (2014),
and WIEDENBECK, supra note 21, at 146-52.
250. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2463. The author contributed to and joined the Brief for
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459
(No. 12-751), 2014 WL 975493.
251. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2465-66 (quoting Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, § 803(h), 90 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)). The
Dudenhoeffer Court failed to acknowledge strong indications that the quoted statutory declaration of intent was enacted as a sop to a single powerful Senator, Russell Long, chairman of
the Finance Committee, and legislative history evidencing congressional prioritization of the
retirement income security objective also went unremarked. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 249,
at 1214-19.
252. See Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2467-71.
253. See id. at 2467-68 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012)).
254. See id. at 2468 (“The term [benefits] does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those
supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer stock.”).
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“specific nonpecuniary goal set out in an ERISA plan,” such as
promoting worker ownership through an ESOP, does not alter the
content of ERISA’s duty of prudence.255 In support of this reading,
the Court pointed to the obligation to follow the documents and
instruments governing the plan “insofar as [they] are consistent
with the provisions of [ERISA].”256 The qualification would be inoperative if special aims set out in the plan documents modified the
standard of prudence, because in that case no conflict could arise.257
The employer also advanced the less nuanced argument that, because the common law countenances exculpatory terms in a private
trust, plan documents obligating the ESOP fiduciary to invest
primarily in company stock should likewise be read to reduce the
prudence standard.258 To this the Court simply responded that “by
contrast to the rule at common law, ‘trust documents cannot excuse
trustees from their duties under ERISA.’”259
This categorical refusal to give effect to plan terms that would
grant variances from fiduciary duties marks a limit on the settlor
function doctrine. Unlike state trust law, which provides a system
of default rules that can be varied by agreement, ERISA put in
place a set of mandatory minimum standards.260 Terms of a plan
document that would directly reduce or negate fiduciary duties are
ineffective, of course.261 But can relaxation of fiduciary obligations
be achieved indirectly by incorporating language in the plan calling
for action that would be imprudent if the choice were left to the
fiduciary’s discretion? Mechanically applied, the settlor function
doctrine would classify the adoption of plan terms that “hard wire”
(mandate) a particular investment as a non-fiduciary act, and by
removing discretion such terms also seem to eliminate fiduciary
status and oversight with respect to the propriety of the obligatory

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 2469.
259. Id. (quoting Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472
U.S. 559, 568 (1985)). Curiously, the Court gave barely a nod to ERISA’s express statutory
prohibitions on reducing fiduciary standards. ERISA sections 404(a)(1)(D) and 410(a) appear
only as a “see also” cite. Id.
260. WIEDENBECK , supra note 21, at 210.
261. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2012).
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investment.262 In refusing to make allowances for a “specific
nonpecuniary goal set out in an ERISA plan,” Dudenhoeffer implies
that this avoidance strategy will not succeed.263 The opinion makes
no mention of the settlor function doctrine however, nor does it cite
the cases that established it, leaving the exact defect in the hardwiring analysis murky.
At a deeper level, Dudenhoeffer offers indirect implicit authority
for the proposition that investment choice is an inherent fiduciary
function. The Court’s opinion fails to acknowledge that the “presumption of prudence” line of cases originated as a safety valve that
allowed courts to disregard plan terms mandating investment in
employer stock in narrowly circumscribed emergency situations. A
plan-based investment mandate, by withholding choice in the matter, arguably makes the trustee’s purchase and holding of employer
stock a non-discretionary—and hence non-fiduciary—action.264 The
“presumption of prudence” recognized by the courts of appeals
effectively incorporated the private trust law doctrine of administrative deviation into ERISA, allowing a limited override of plan terms
when that is necessary to avoid frustration of the trust’s purposes.265
262. See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing settlor
function doctrine cases and noting that decision to restrict investment choices “bears more
resemblance to the basic structuring of a Plan than to its day-to-day management” and may
not even be “a decision within [the employer’s] fiduciary responsibilities”).
263. See Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2468.
264. Discretionary authority relating to plan management or administration is not always
necessary to create fiduciary status. In addition, any person who actually “exercises any
authority or control respecting management or disposition” of plan assets is a fiduciary.
ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Consequently, anyone handling plan assets, even
low-level functionaries assigned purely ministerial roles, can be held accountable under
ERISA for losses due to diversion or neglect. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 21, at 112-13.
Hence an ESOP trustee buying and holding employer stock is to that extent acting as a fiduciary even if the plan requires all assets be invested in employer stock. Yet such a trustee is a
fiduciary only “to the extent” of his exercise of management or control over plan assets. ERISA
§ 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Matters that are beyond one’s control—in this case,
exclusive investment in employer stock—therefore cannot give rise to personal liability for
breach of fiduciary duties. That is, a fiduciary with respect to certain actions, roles, or
decisions is not a fiduciary at all times and for all purposes. See Colleen E. Medill, The Law
of Directed Trustees Under ERISA: A Proposed Blueprint for the Federal Courts, 61 MO . L.
REV. 825, 859 (1996) (discussing limitations on liability of trustees who invest at the direction
of other fiduciaries); see also In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 423, 441-51
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same); Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-03, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Dec. 17, 2004)
[https://perma.cc/4BY5-HV49] (same).
265. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 249, at 1206-14 (discussing the origins and application
of the administrative deviation doctrine in the context of ERISA).
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The Supreme Court’s Dudenhoeffer opinion ignores the tension
between a mandatory duty and fiduciary status. In doing so, it
suggests that plan investments, even if prescribed by plan terms
adopted by the settlor in an intentional design decision,266 are
necessarily subject to fiduciary oversight. If that inference is correct,
then there are two limits on the settlor function doctrine. One is
extrinsic—the restrictions on amendments (most significantly, the
accrued benefit anti-reduction rule) explored previously.267 The
other is intrinsic—a complementary fiduciary function doctrine.268
Outside the realm of fiduciary responsibility, Dudenhoeffer does
not call into question plan provisions that indirectly encroach upon
ERISA policies. Plan terms that work at cross purposes to, but stop
short of explicit contradiction of, other ERISA requirements can be
imposed without fiduciary accountability under the settlor function
doctrine. Consider, for example, a forum selection clause requiring
participants to bring civil enforcement claims in a federal district
court convenient to the employer (for example, situs of company
headquarters) but far distant from the residence of the participant
or the location of witnesses. Such a restriction may not directly
contradict any statutory obligation,269 but it burdens and may
discourage civil enforcement, and is in tension with Congress’s expressed goal of “providing ... ready access to the Federal courts.”270
While the effectiveness of such a forum restriction is open to challenge,271 that the restriction was imposed to benefit the employer is
266. See Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2464 (observing that “Fifth Third’s matching contributions ... are always invested initially” in company stock); Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit
Sharing Plan Arts. 7.1(d), 7.4(d), 2 Joint Appendix 283, 347, 350-51, Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct.
2459 (No. 12-751) (“Trustee shall have no discretionary authority to sell Fifth Third Bancorp
shares or to refrain from acquiring additional Fifth Third Bancorp shares with funds not held
for short-run liquidity needs.”).
267. See supra Part III.
268. See supra note 100.
269. But see ERISA § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (providing that federal suits under
ERISA “may be brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took
place, or where a defendant resides or may be found”).
270. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
271. See, e.g., Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 932 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding
that ERISA plan sponsors are permitted to designate the federal courts in which their
participants may bring claims arising under ERISA); Mathias v. Caterpillar, Inc., 203 F.
Supp. 3d 570, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (same); Malagoli v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 14-CV7180 (AJN), 2016 WL 1181708, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2016) (same); Harley v. Bank of N.Y.
Mellon, No. 1:15-CV-1384, 2015 WL 6956564, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2015) (finding that a
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no ground for setting it aside. As Professors Muir and Stein
observed, the Supreme Court’s ERISA jurisprudence “implies that
a plan may enforce any written terms that are not directly inconsistent with ERISA’s requirements, suggesting few legal limits on
onerous plan terms.”272
B. Implicit Exculpation
The stringency of fiduciary duties—particularly the force of the
exclusive benefit rule, ERISA’s duty of loyalty—has been quietly but
decisively eroded by the Supreme Court’s recent scope of review
decisions. Supreme Court decisions reviewing actions of plan fiduciaries who are company insiders make allowances for the resulting
conflicts of interest. Limited monitoring of judgment calls by insider
fiduciaries creates a safe space or immunity for employer-regarding
decisions, so the practice functions like an exculpatory clause.
Consequently, appointing employer representatives as fiduciaries
introduces a de facto or implicit exculpatory clause into the program.
ERISA allows an officer, employee, or agent of the plan sponsor
to serve as fiduciary.273 Nevertheless, such an insider fiduciary is expressly barred from acting “in any transaction involving the plan
on behalf of a party (or represent[ing] a party) whose interests are
adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries.”274 Moreover, the insider fiduciary remains
forum selection clause applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim). But see Dumont v. Pepsico,
Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 219 (D. Me. 2016) (holding that enforcing a forum selection clause
would undermine the goal of ready access to federal courts); Nicolas v. MCI Health & Welfare
Plan No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same). The Labor Department has
filed amicus briefs asserting that forum selection clauses should be held invalid under ERISA.
E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, 10, Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan,
136 S. Ct. 791 (2016) (No. 14-1168).
272. Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 507.
273. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3), (authorizing insider fiduciaries); accord
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(11), (e)(2)(C), (H) (2012) (providing a corresponding exemption from the
prohibited transaction excise tax).
274. ERISA § 406(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2). Interestingly, this ban on acting on behalf
of the employer or representing the employer’s interest is omitted from the Tax Code’s version
of the prohibited transaction rules. Compare ERISA § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b), with I.R.C.
§ 4975(c)(1)(E)-(F). That omission presumably stems from the excise tax penalty’s dependence
on the “amount involved” in the prohibited transaction, I.R.C. § 4975(a), (f)(4), which is not
readily ascertainable in situations in which a fiduciary, rather than engaging in self-dealing,
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at all times subject to the general imperative that he “discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries.”275 These obligations to disregard the employer’s
interests were not meant as default rules that could be relaxed by
advance arrangement. ERISA declares that “any provision in an
agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from
responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty
under [ERISA’s fiduciary monitoring scheme] shall be void as
against public policy.”276 In operation, that negation of exculpatory
clauses has proven to be far less robust than it reads on paper. This
Part will identify the origin of that weakness and explain how it has
evolved to grant insider fiduciaries latitude to take account of
employer interests in plan decision-making, relaxing the apparent
rigor of the exclusive benefit rule. Such implicit or crypto-exculpatory clauses moderate the rigidity of ERISA’s fiduciary regime,
achieving results similar to (but notably less transparent than) the
interest balancing approach advanced by Professors Fischel and
Langbein.
At the outset it should be understood that ERISA’s authorization
of insider fiduciaries represents a major departure from private
trust law. Traditionally, a trustee committed a breach of trust (specifically, a violation of the duty of loyalty) by engaging in a transaction in which she had a conflict of interest, without regard to
whether the trustee acted in good faith or whether the outcome was
objectively fair to the trust beneficiaries.277 This “no-further-inquiry”
rule establishes a prophylactic standard designed to bar deals
involving a high risk of abuse.278 Its uncompromising approach can
merely privileges the employer’s interests.
275. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
276. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a).
277. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS. § 78(2) & cmts. a-b (AM . LAW INST. 2007); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND ) OF TRS. § 170 & cmt. b (AM . LAW INST. 1959); IIA SCOTT & FRATCHER , supra note
179, § 170 (“[A trustee] is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for
his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries.”).
278. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS. § 78 cmt. b (“[U]nder the so-called ‘no further
inquiry’ principle it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the action in
question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no
profit resulted to the trustee.”); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 242, § 543. See generally
Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John
Langbein, 47 WM . & MARY L. REV. 541 (2005).
The canonical judicial formulation of the doctrine was supplied by Judge Cardozo in Wendt
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be relaxed by the settlor’s authorization of conflicted transactions,
but such exculpatory language is narrowly construed and liability
is imposed if the trustee fails to act in good faith.279 Absent the
settlor’s authorization, a trustee subject to a conflict of interest
could avoid liability only by obtaining advance judicial approval of
the transaction or by obtaining the fully informed consent of all
trust beneficiaries.280 ERISA’s permission of conflicted fiduciaries
operates in effect as a statutory exculpatory clause, displacing the
no-further-inquiry rule. Yet consistent with private trust law,
conflicted fiduciaries are still commanded to act in good faith—that
is, “for the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries” and defraying reasonable costs of plan
administration.281 Acceptance of conflicted fiduciaries was apparently deemed a necessary concession to longstanding practice under
pre-ERISA benefit plans. Rejecting the no-further inquiry rule,
however, did not directly cause attenuation of the exclusive benefit
rule. After all, the “exclusive purpose” (good faith) command explicitly denounces employer-regarding decisions. Instead, ERISA’s
toleration of employer-representative fiduciaries diluted fiduciary
obligations by a circuitous path involving the scope of judicial
review of benefit claim denials.

v. Fischer:
If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effective must lay bare the
truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance.... [W]e are
told that the [fiduciaries] acted in good faith, that the terms procured were the
best obtainable at the moment, and that the wrong, if any, was unaccompanied
by damage. This is no sufficient answer by a trustee forgetful of his duty. The
law “does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or
unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the
transaction or refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary undertook to represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of
abstract justice in the particular case.” Only by this uncompromising rigidity has
the rule of undivided loyalty been maintained against disintegrating erosion.
154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (quoting Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R., 8 N.E.
355, 358 (N.Y. 1886)).
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS. § 78 cmt. c(2); RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. §§ 170
cmt. t, 222(2); IIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 179, § 170.9; III SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra
note 179, §§ 222, 222.2-.3.
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS. § 78 cmts. c, c(1), c(3); RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS.
§§ 170 cmts. a, f, 216(3); IIA SCOTT & FRATCHER , supra note 179, § 170.7; III SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 179, § 216.
281. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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The first fateful step down the road to implicit exculpation was
taken with the Supreme Court’s announcement in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch that “a denial of benefits challenged under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) [ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)] is to be reviewed under a de
novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
or to construe the terms of the plan.”282 The message that the
intensity of judicial scrutiny, which often determines the outcome
on judicial review, can be dialed back by including appropriate language in the plan document was unmistakable.283 Sponsors responded by inserting in their plans express grants of fiduciary discretion
282. 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Firestone’s standard of review analysis was drawn from a
comparison to private trust law. Id. at 110 (“ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. ERISA’s legislative history confirms that the Act’s fiduciary responsibility
provisions ‘codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed
in the evolution of the law of trusts.’” (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO . 93-533,
at 11 (1973))). Reliance on that analogy was the central and perhaps decisive development in
ERISA’s trust law turn, meaning the judicial privileging of the statute’s trust law aspects over
its contract law side. After 1989, analytic reference to private trust law was repeatedly
invoked in ERISA cases, rose to rhetorical prominence, and became entrenched. The Court’s
settlor function decisions of the late 1990s, of course, contributed importantly to that
entrenchment. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
283. Some commentators recognized that Firestone’s relaxation of the standard of review
amounts in substance to judicial endorsement of an exculpatory clause, and would seem to be
at odds with the statutory prohibition on exculpatory clauses, ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1110(a). See WIEDENBECK, supra note 21, at 162 n.37; John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court
Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 222 & n.53.
A number of states have acted to prohibit application of a deferential standard of review
in insurance claim litigation. See Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D. L. REV. 500, 504-06 (2011) (reporting that nearly one-third of the states have
adopted such bans). The National Association of Insurance Law Commissioners promulgated
the Prohibition on the Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act in 2002. PROHIBITION ON THE
USE OF DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES MODEL ACT (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMN ’RS 2006), http://
www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DE9-HJUY]. Under ERISA’s insurance law savings clause, ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), such a ban is
effective as applied to an insured plan. See Orzechowski v. Boeing Co. Non-Union Long-Term
Disability Plan, 856 F.3d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 2017); Fontaine v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d
883, 885 (7th Cir. 2015); Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2009); Am.
Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2009). Insured pension plans are
rare, and virtually all large employers also self-insure their health care plans. Consequently,
the abuse-of-discretion standard of review continues to be overwhelmingly dominant in
ERISA civil enforcement actions. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured
Plans After Davila, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 739-40 (2005); see also Maria O’Brien Hylton,
Post-Firestone Skirmishes: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Discretionary
Clauses, and Judicial Review of ERISA Plan Administrator Decisions, 2 WM . & MARY POL’Y
REV. 1 (2010).
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to interpret plan terms and determine benefit eligibility.284 Therefore, despite the holding that de novo review is the default mode of
judicial oversight of ERISA benefit claim denials, the abuse-ofdiscretion standard quickly became overwhelmingly dominant.285
1. Loyalty
Conferring broad authority to construe plan terms on a fiduciary,
who may be (and typically is) an officer, employee, or agent of the
plan sponsor,286 naturally invites decisions that accommodate the
employer’s interests. The Firestone Court acknowledged as much in
dicta, observing, “Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”287 Under the exclusive
benefit rule, the employer’s interests are not germane to fiduciary
284. Hylton, supra note 283, at 2. For additional discussion and examples, see MICHAEL J.
CANAN & WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, EMPLOYEE FRINGE AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS §§ 16:26-:28
(2015); id. app. F, § 7.4(h) (model group health plan); id. app. G, § 7.3(f) (model group term life
insurance plan); 3 MICHAEL J. CANAN & CHARLES C. SHULMAN , QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS
457, 708 (2015-2016 ed.) (providing model grant of administrative powers under IRS-approved
volume submitter defined benefit plan and 401(k) plan, respectively); [Plans and Clauses]
Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) ¶ 30,047 (Sept. 10, 2007) (providing in model defined benefit pension
plan § 8.5(a) that the pension committee shall have “discretionary authority to construe and
interpret the plan, to decide all questions of eligibility,” accompanied by an annotation citing
Firestone); [Plans and Clauses] Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) ¶ 31,133 (Sept. 24, 2007) (corresponding language in model 401(k) profit-sharing plan).
285. How clear a grant of discretionary authority must be to work a relaxation of the scope
of review is an issue that still arises occasionally. See, e.g., Stephanie C. v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Mass. HMO Blue, Inc., 813 F.3d 420, 428 (1st Cir. 2016) (subjecting a claim denial
to de novo review because the plan statement that BCBS “decides which health care services
and supplies that you receive ... are medically necessary and appropriate for coverage” fails
to “unambiguously indicate that the claims administrator has discretion to construe the terms
of the plan and determine whether benefits are due in particular instances”); Sandy v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 222 F.3d 1202, 1204 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to grant
discretion on the requirement that a claimant submit “satisfactory proof ” but noting the
“awkward position” of interpreting identical plan language differently than the Sixth Circuit);
Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding
the submission of “satisfactory proof ” insufficient to relax the standard of review). But see
Nance v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 294 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding the
requirement of proof “satisfactory to [insurer]” was sufficient to confer discretion).
286. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
287. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF
TRS. § 187 cmt. d (AM . LAW INST. 1959)).
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decision-making; taking such extraneous interests into account—
consideration of an issue that Congress declared irrelevant—
exemplifies abuse of discretion.288 Nevertheless, today courts apply
a deferential standard of judicial review to decisions made by
insider fiduciaries in a manner that is virtually insensitive to the
pressure of acutely conflicting interests.
Twice within a two-year period the Supreme Court addressed how
a fiduciary conflict of interest should figure into judicial review of
determinations made under plans conferring broad discretionary
authority.289 While the holdings are superficially consistent, the
opinions bespeak conflicting philosophies and shifting alliances.
Read in combination they send a message that employer-inflected
fiduciary judgments can ordinarily be expected to escape judicial
attention.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn confirmed that an employer that both funds the plan and has discretionary authority to
evaluate benefit claims acts under a conflict of interest that must be
taken into account on judicial review of benefit denials.290 The same
conclusion applies to an insurance company that both evaluates and
288. As the concept is deployed in private trust law, abuse of discretion connotes the
trustee acting “dishonestly, or with an improper even though not dishonest motive, or fail[ing]
to use his judgment, or act[ing] beyond the bounds of ... reasonable judgment.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND ) OF TRS . § 187 cmt. e (AM . LAW INST. 1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRS.
§ 87 cmt. c (AM . LAW INST. 2007); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 50 (AM . LAW INST.
2003) (providing that discretionary power to determine benefits due a trust beneficiary
reviewed for abuse of discretion); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 814, 1008 (UNIF. LAW COMM ’N 2000)
(addressing discretionary powers and effect of exculpatory terms). A court will intervene if
“the trustee in exercising or failing to exercise a power does so ... to further some interest of
his own or of a person other than the beneficiary.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TRS. § 187 cmt.
g; see III SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 179, § 187.5 (characterizing improper motive as
abuse).
Abuse-of-discretion review is particularly well developed in the context of judicial oversight
of administrative decisions. It is a fundamental tenet of administrative law that reliance on
an irrelevant or improper consideration is an abuse of discretion. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”).
289. See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554
U.S. 105 (2008).
290. 554 U.S. at 112; see also ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW , EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW 13-62 to -73 (3d ed. 2015); WIEDENBECK, supra note 21, at 165-68.
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pays claims under an insured plan, notwithstanding Met Life’s argument that a commercial insurer’s reputational interest in product
quality shows that market forces provide sufficient countervailing
incentives for fair decision making.291 Turning to how such structural conflicts of interest affect judicial review, Justice Stephen
Breyer, writing for six members of the Court, endorsed the Firestone
dicta, holding that “a reviewing court should consider that conflict
as a factor in determining whether the plan administrator has
abused its discretion in denying benefits; and that the significance
of the factor will depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case.”292
Instructing that a structural conflict must be evaluated as one
factor, of variable weight, in a holistic abuse-of-discretion assessment, the Court repudiated appellate decisions that had imposed a
heightened standard of review (increasing the intensity of judicial
scrutiny to de novo review).293 Moreover, it disavowed special
procedural or evidentiary mechanisms (like shifting the burden of
proof), which some courts had adopted to expose whether a conflict
tainted the decision.294 Yet three Justices strongly objected to the
majority’s formulation on the ground that it makes the process of
review indeterminate and unpredictable, and does not go far enough

291. See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 114-15. The reputational argument had met with some success
in the courts of appeals. See Rud v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 438 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006);
Wright v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Grp. Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2005)
(following the market forces rationale, while recognizing that other circuits are unpersuaded);
Mers v. Marriott Int’l Grp. Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020-21
(7th Cir. 1998) (“We presume that a fiduciary is acting neutrally unless a claimant shows by
providing specific evidence of actual bias that there is a significant conflict. The existence of
a potential conflict is not enough.” (citations omitted)). Those decisions concluded that the
amount involved in an individual benefit claim is too small to affect a large employer or
insurer, and that the employer has an interest in maintaining a reputation for fair dealing
with its employees. Contra Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir.
2000).
In Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, Judge Easterbrook discounted an insurer-fiduciary’s conflict on the ground that group insurance policies
are experience-rated, with the employer agreeing to reimburse the insurer for benefit
payments or pay higher premiums for future years’ coverage, so that the insurer does not
ultimately bear the cost of approved claims. 195 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 1999).
292. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 108 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115
(1989)).
293. See id. at 115-16.
294. See id. at 116-17.
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in insulating benefit denials made by conflicted fiduciaries from
challenges in court.295
The Chief Justice complained that according a conflict some (unspecified) weight in every case in which it is present
would allow the bare existence of a conflict to enhance the
significance of other factors already considered by reviewing
courts, even if the conflict is not shown to have played any role
in the denial of benefits. The end result is to increase the level
of scrutiny in every case in which there is a conflict—that is, in
many if not most ERISA cases—thereby undermining the deference owed to plan administrators when the plan vests discretion
in them.296

Instead, he would “consider the conflict of interest on review only
where there is evidence that the benefits denial was motivated or
affected by the administrator’s conflict.”297 Observing that “[i]t is the
actual motivation that matters in reviewing benefits decisions for an
abuse of discretion, not the bare presence of the conflict itself,” Chief
Justice Roberts asserted that “a conflict of interest can support a
finding that an administrator abused its discretion only where the
evidence demonstrates that the conflict actually motivated or
influenced the claims decision.”298 In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Thomas, also emphasized this point, and drew the subtly
more restrictive inference that “a fiduciary with a conflict does not
abuse its discretion unless the conflict actually and improperly motivates the decision.”299

295. See id. at 119-22 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (complaining that the majority accords
“varying and indeterminate” weight to conflicts and “leaves the law more uncertain, more
unpredictable than it found it”); id. at 127-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s
“totality-of-the-circumstance (so-called) ‘test’” as “nothing but de novo review in sheep’s clothing”).
296. Id. at 120 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 123.
299. Id. at 128 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord id. at 133 (“A trustee’s conflict of interest is
relevant (and only relevant) for determining whether he abused his discretion by acting with
an improper motive. It does not itself prove that he did so, but it is the predicate for an
inquiry into motive, and can be part of the circumstantial evidence establishing wrongful
motive.”).
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ERISA’s specification of fiduciary duties does indeed focus on
motivation. The exclusive benefit rule, after all, provides that the
fiduciary—who is authorized to serve despite being an agent or
representative of the employer—shall discharge his duties “for the
exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries” and to defray reasonable expenses of plan administration.300 Because a fiduciary’s decision will never directly admit that
benefits were denied to save the employer or insurer money, the
crux of the dispute between Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justice Scalia comes down to the weight (if any) to be accorded
circumstantial evidence of improper motivation. Alternatively, their
differences concern how reviewing courts should handle indications,
which on the facts of a particular case may be more or less troubling, that a conflict might have influenced the outcome.
The Chief Justice fears that telling the lower courts that they
“should consider the mere existence of a conflict in every case, without focusing that consideration in any way, invites the substitution
of judicial discretion for the discretion of the plan administrator.”301
Hence he would focus on whether the conflict “actually affected the
decision.”302 Yet the examples he offers of evidence indicating improper motivation or that the conflict actually influenced the decision involve hypothetical or extraordinary situations.303 Evidence
of this sort—virtually a smoking gun standard—would be encountered only in exceedingly rare cases. Justices Scalia and Thomas
take an even more restrictive view. They would presume that a conflicted fiduciary “suppressed his selfish interest (as the settlor anticipated) in compliance with his duties of good faith and loyalty.
Only such a presumption can vindicate the trust principles and
ERISA provisions that permit settlors to appoint fiduciaries with a
conflict in the first place.”304
300. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
301. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 121 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
302. Id. at 123.
303. See id. (mentioning incentives or bonuses for claim savings, a pattern of arbitrary
benefits denials, bad faith contract misinterpretations, and other unscrupulous tactics). The
example of a pattern of bad faith contract interpretations and unscrupulous tactics is real but
exceptional; it refers to the Unum/Provident scandal. See generally John H. Langbein, Trust
Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials
Under ERISA, 101 NW . U. L. REV. 1315 (2007).
304. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 133-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citations
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In contrast, the Glenn majority’s approach would allow district
courts leeway to set aside a benefit denial made by a conflicted
decision maker if the reviewing court concludes that the conflict of
interest might have infected the decision. Justice Breyer instructs
courts to take “account of several different, often case-specific, factors, reaching a result by weighing all together.”305
In such instances, any one factor will act as a tiebreaker when
the other factors are closely balanced, the degree of closeness
necessary depending upon the tiebreaking factor’s inherent or
case-specific importance. The conflict of interest at issue here,
for example, should prove more important (perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that
it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited to,
cases where an insurance company administrator has a history
of biased claims administration. It should prove less important
(perhaps to the vanishing point) where the administrator has
taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote
accuracy, for example, by walling off claims administrators from
those interested in firm finances, or by imposing management
checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective of
whom the inaccuracy benefits.306

This passage captures the essential difference between unusual
cases that present persuasive evidence that a conflict “actually
affected the decision”307 and circumstances that “suggest a higher
likelihood that [conflict] affected the benefits decision.”308
The Glenn majority’s adoption of the more wide-ranging, contextsensitive, and judicial-discretion-dependent standard permits more
omitted). Other parts of Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion suggest that this presumption
would be virtually irrebuttable (a rule of law). After positing that “[a] trustee’s conflict of
interest is relevant (and only relevant) for determining whether he abused his discretion by
acting with an improper motive,” the dissent concedes that reaching an unreasonable decision
could be circumstantial evidence tending to show wrongful motive. Id. at 133. Yet under trust
law an unreasonable decision alone constitutes an abuse of discretion. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND ) OF TRS. § 187 cmt. e (AM . LAW INST. 1959); Glenn, 554 U.S. at 132 (“[A] trustee’s conflict of interest is irrelevant to determining the substantive reasonableness of his decision.”).
Therefore, the conflict arguably plays no independent role on judicial review.
305. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117 (majority opinion).
306. Id. (citation omitted).
307. Id. at 123 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
308. Id. at 117 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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frequent findings that insider fiduciaries abused discretion in
denying benefits. That prospect, in turn, can be expected to induce
more ERISA litigation challenging benefit denials, compared to the
meager chance of success that disappointed claimants would face
under the alternative approaches. And the incentive to litigate may
be further enhanced by the disposition in Glenn. The Court affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which had ordered reinstatement of Glenn’s long-term disability benefits, retroactive to the date
on which they had been terminated.309 Upon finding abuse, the
Sixth Circuit rendered decision in Glenn’s favor; it did not return
the case to the plan fiduciary with instructions to reconsider the
matter, this time exercising discretion properly.310
Just two years later, such a remand to the fiduciary brought the
standard of review question back to the Supreme Court. Conkright
v. Frommert addressed whether an administrator whose plan interpretation has been set aside on judicial review as an abuse of
discretion is entitled to the benefit of the doubt (essentially, another
application of the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard) when
her revised interpretation is challenged on judicial review.311 This
issue triggered a realignment of positions, with Chief Justice
Roberts writing a fiduciary-friendly opinion for the Court, and Justice Breyer vehemently dissenting.312
The plan interpretation issue in Frommert concerned the effect of
lump sum distributions received by Xerox employees upon separation from service in situations in which the employee later returned
to work for the company.313 Under Xerox’s defined benefit plan, such
rehired employees were entitled to a pension based upon all of their
years of service, subject to a setoff to reflect the earlier cash out, but
the plan failed to specify the actuarial computation that would be
used to determine the setoff.314 Nor were participants notified of the
methodology the plan would utilize in such cases, as required by
309. Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 461 F.3d 660, 675 (6th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 554 U.S. 105
(2008).
310. Id.
311. See 559 U.S. 506, 509 (2010).
312. See id. at 509, 522.
313. See id. at 510.
314. See id. at 510-11; see also I.R.C. § 401(a)(25) (2012) (requiring that actuarial assumptions used by a qualified defined benefit plan be “specified in the plan in a way which precludes employer discretion”).
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ERISA’s disclosure rules.315 The plan granted authority to construe
its terms to the administrators, who were Xerox executives.316 In
deciding how to plug this gap in the plan, the administrators
therefore acted under a structural conflict of interest.317 The plan
administrators’ initial response to the problem was to use the
“phantom account” method—they calculated the hypothetical
growth of the amount that had been distributed on the assumption
that it had remained in Xerox’s investment funds, and reduced
respondent’s present benefits accordingly.318 The district court employed a (deferential) limited scope of review, as required by Glenn,
and granted summary judgment for the plan.319 The Second Circuit
nonetheless set aside the phantom account approach as an unreasonable interpretation.320 On remand the administrators instead
accounted for the time value of money by using a fixed interest rate
determined as of the date of the lump sum distribution.321 When the
parties returned to court for a second round of judicial review, the
district court did not accord the administrators’ revised interpretation a deferential scope of review.322 Instead, the district judge
substituted his judgment, ordering offset by only the nominal dollar
amount of the earlier distribution, with no allowance for the growth
in that amount over time.323 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that
the district court was not required to use a deferential standard of
review—that it was entitled to reject a reasonable interpretation of
the plan and impose its own reading—when the administrators’
earlier decision had been set aside as an abuse of discretion.324
Calling the Second Circuit’s decision “an exception to Firestone
deference,”325 the Court held that “a single honest mistake in plan
315. See Frommert, 559 U.S. at 527 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also ERISA § 204(g)-(h), 29
U.S.C. § 1054(g)-(h) (2012) (providing accrued benefit anti-reduction rule and required advance notice of accrual rate reduction).
316. Frommert, 559 U.S. at 512 (majority opinion).
317. See id.
318. Id. at 510.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 510-11.
322. Id. at 511.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 512. Technically, the Firestone Court’s observations on the standard of review
applicable to decisions made by fiduciaries cloaked with discretionary authority is dicta, as
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interpretation” does not justify “stripping the administrator of ...
deference for subsequent related interpretations of the plan.”326 In
drawing that conclusion, the majority observed that authorities on
private trust law provide that “a court will strip a trustee of his
discretion when there is reason to believe that he will not exercise
that discretion fairly—for example, upon a showing that the trustee
has already acted in bad faith.”327 In this case, however, “the lower
courts made no finding that the Plan Administrator had acted in
bad faith or would not fairly exercise his discretion to interpret the
terms of the Plan.”328 The absence of a finding of improper motive
supports the “single honest mistake” refrain. It also implicates the
Chief Justice’s position in Glenn, that “a conflict of interest can support a finding that an administrator abused its discretion only
where the evidence demonstrates that the conflict actually motivated or influenced the claims decision.”329 That resonance, combined
with the shift between Glenn and Frommert in the composition of
the Court’s majority and dissenting coalitions,330 suggests that
Frommert implicitly endorses Chief Justice Roberts’s restrictive
view of the circumstances that will support a ruling that an insider
Justice Scalia emphasized in his Glenn dissent. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105,
128 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling Firestone comments on deference “sheer dictum” and
stating that the majority “takes that throwaway dictum literally and builds a castle upon it”).
326. Frommert, 559 U.S. at 509.
327. Id. at 514.
328. Id. at 515. Following remand the Second Circuit applied “Firestone deference” (the
abuse of discretion standard of review). See Frommert v. Conkright, 738 F.3d 522, 529 (2d Cir.
2013). Although there was no finding of bad faith, it held the administrator’s proposed offset
to be an unreasonable interpretation of the plan (hence an abuse of discretion) because it
would have left the rehired workers worse off than newly hired Xerox employees. See id. at
529-30. Thereafter, instead of having the administrator issue yet another interpretation, the
district court ordered that the plaintiffs “receive whatever benefits they are due for their
second period of employment, the same as if they were new hires. Their prior benefits will
neither diminish their later benefits, nor will their prior period of service be used to grant
them a windfall.” Frommert v. Becker, 153 F. Supp. 3d 599, 606 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).
329. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 123 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
330. Three members of the Frommert majority (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia
and Thomas) had objected to Glenn’s combination-of-factors approach to review of conflicted
decision-making, while the dissenters in Frommert (Justices Breyer, Stevens and Ginsburg)
were all in the Glenn majority. Justices Alito and Kennedy seem to have changed their views,
as Alito voted with the majority in each case, while Kennedy, who objected only to the failure
to remand Glenn, joined the Court’s opinion in Frommert. Justice Souter, a member of the
Glenn majority, was replaced by Justice Sotomayor, who did not participate in Frommert
because she had heard a related case while a judge on the Second Circuit.

2018]

UNTRUSTWORTHY: ERISA’S ERODED FIDUCIARY LAW

1083

fiduciary’s conflict of interest led to an abuse of discretion. Remember that Frommert involved a structural conflict of interest, in that
the plan administrator’s choice of method for calculating the offset
for prior distributions would directly impact Xerox’s funding obligation and pension costs.331 Those circumstances raise the question,
was Glenn silently overruled by Frommert?332
Frommert, of course, did not directly involve the issue that divided the Court in Glenn: how a structural conflict of interest should be
taken into account on judicial review under the abuse of discretion
standard. Writing for the Court in Frommert, the Chief Justice cites
Glenn several times, and indeed the two decisions are facially
consistent: “If, as we held in Glenn, a systemic conflict of interest
does not strip a plan administrator of deference, it is difficult to see
why a single honest mistake would require a different result.”333 Yet
in Frommert, Chief Justice Roberts never mentions, much less
confirms or endorses, Glenn’s wide-ranging totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determining whether a conflict of interest had
pernicious effects. When it comes to operationalizing abuse-ofdiscretion review of decisions by an insider fiduciary, Frommert
emphasizes substantive reasonableness—the focus is on assuring
prudence, not questioning loyalty.334 Tacitly, Frommert seems to
imply that monitoring for employer-regarding decisions should be
limited to a cursory scan for glaring signs of favoritism (Chief
Justice Roberts’s position in Glenn), rather than a hard look review
331. See Frommert, 559 U.S. at 510.
332. The Frommert majority opinion avoids forthrightly acknowledging as much. In light
of the brief interval between the decisions, perhaps that omission was deliberate.
333. Frommert, 559 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted).
334. The Frommert majority insisted that an unreasonable decision by a fiduciary acting
under a systemic conflict of interest should simply be treated as an “honest mistake,” rather
than as supporting an inference that an improper motive was at work. See id. (rejecting the
view that the district court is entitled to reject the administrator’s reasonable interpretation
of the plan “solely because” a previous interpretation had been overturned as unreasonable);
id. at 515 (emphasizing that a district court should not act as a substitute trustee if it has
“made no finding that the Plan Administrator had acted in bad faith or would not fairly
exercise his discretion to interpret the terms of the Plan”); id. at 521 (concluding that “plan
administrator’s interpretation of the plan ‘will not be disturbed if reasonable’” (quoting
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989))). This position echoes Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Glenn, which asserted that a “reasonable decision is reasonable whether
or not the person who makes it has a conflict” and that “[a] trustee’s conflict of interest is
relevant (and only relevant) for determining whether he abused his discretion by acting with
an improper motive.” Glenn, 554 U.S. at 132-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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for telltale indicia of improper influence (as Justice Breyer would
have it in Glenn).
Several factors lend support to the inference that Frommert
adopts such a revisionist reading of Glenn. Both the Frommert
majority and dissent rely on ERISA policies, but the majority
prioritizes cost containment.335 Efficient, predictable, and uniform
resolution of benefit disputes are touted as advantages of preserving
an insider fiduciary’s decision-making authority, leading the majority to conclude that internal administrative proceedings are preferable to costly and unpredictable litigation.336 In contrast, Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Frommert emphasizes that “ERISA’s core purpose of ‘promot[ing] the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans’” would be better served by granting
reviewing courts wider latitude to intervene once a conflicted
fiduciary has abused discretion.337 This difference in priorities is
likewise manifest in the Glenn opinions. In both cases the Chief
Justice champions narrowly circumscribed judicial oversight to improve predictability and contain costs, while Justice Breyer’s concern to protect the interests of employees calls for more skepticism
and a larger judicial role in reviewing benefit denials made by
conflicted fiduciaries. This common theme reveals that in a short
span of time a majority of the Court’s members came to prefer a
much more hands-off approach to judicial review of conflicted
decision-making. One cannot know what induced the turn around,
but it may be relevant that in the immediate aftermath of Glenn
some lower courts granted workers’ requests for discovery of
evidence outside the decision file compiled by the fiduciary (the
usual “record” on review), in an effort to uncover improper inputs or
influences, or to determine whether adverse inferences should be
drawn from procedural irregularities.338 Perhaps the prospect of a
greatly expanded commitment of judicial resources to ERISA cases

335. The cost containment theme is part of a broader trend in ERISA case law. See supra
note 205 and accompanying text.
336. See Frommert, 559 U.S. at 517-21.
337. See id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
338. ABA SECTION ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW , supra note 290, at 201-03, 206-07
(2015 Cumulative Supp.).
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curbed the enthusiasm of some Justices for the search for subtle
signs of disloyalty.339
Whatever the reason for the change, the operation of improper
influences will rarely be seen if the reviewing court is not commissioned to look for it. When juxtaposed with Glenn, Frommert seems
to say just that—do not go searching. As a practical matter, that
constraint allows insider fiduciaries to render plan interpretations
and claims decisions that compromise the employees’ interests with
the needs of their employer, so long as they refrain from admitting
as much. This implicit exculpation of employer-inflected decisionmaking by insider fiduciaries shows that courts have covertly
degraded the intensity of fiduciary obligations. Should we dismiss
the obligation to act “solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries”340 as so much hortatory nonsense? Maybe.341 At minimum, the Court’s standard of review decisions evidence a relaxation
of the stringency of ERISA’s duty of loyalty. The new “property” in
employee benefits is weak property, both because it is narrowly
defined and loosely enforced.342
2. Care
Frommert appears to tacitly concede some space for an insider
fiduciary to make allowances for the employer’s interest. Does
naming a company representative as fiduciary have repercussions

339. This pull back is arguably consistent with general trends in the Roberts Court’s
decisions, including limits on federal court litigation (such as enhanced pleading standards
and restrictions on class actions), and a pro-business philosophy.
340. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
341. Contrast the implication of Frommert with Judge Friendly’s famous declaration that
decisions of an insider fiduciary must be “made with an eye single to the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries.” Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982). As
for situations of acute conflict, “perhaps ... resignation [is] the only proper course.” Id. at 276.
342. See supra table and text accompanying note 113. In contrast to the implicit exculpation seemingly endorsed by Frommert, in NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., the Court disavowed
such a reading of the Taft-Hartley Act. 453 U.S. 322 (1981). Although multiemployer pension
or welfare plans are administered by “an equal balance between trustees appointed by the
union and those appointed by the employer,” and despite the statute’s designation of the
trustees as representatives of the employer or the employees, “nothing in the language of
§ 302(c)(5) reveals any congressional intent that a trustee should or may administer a trust
fund in the interest of the party that appointed him, or that an employer may direct or
supervise the decisions of a trustee he has appointed.” Id. at 330.
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beyond ERISA’s duty of loyalty? Does implicit exculpation extend as
well to ERISA’s duty of care?
ERISA experts might be startled by that prospect, because courts
presented with breach of duty claims against conflicted fiduciaries
have commonly shrunk from finding a violation of the exclusive
purpose standard, thereby sidestepping its unmistakable suggestion
of bad faith. Instead, courts have fallen back on review for “procedural prudence.”343 If careful examination of the course of decisionmaking (such as the extent of fact gathering, consultation with
expert advisors, discussion) reveals a rushed, truncated, or cavalier
process, then the decision can be set aside as imprudent by reference to objective evidence, without impugning anyone’s integrity. In
this way, review for prudence has evolved into an important safeguard against egregious violations of the duty or loyalty: incompetence is taken as a proxy for corruption.
Although it may come as a surprise, indications are that the
presence of an insider fiduciary in some circumstances indirectly
modulates ERISA’s duty of care. Ironically, that inference emerges
from the case in which the Supreme Court steadfastly—and unanimously—refused to formally relax the prudence standard.344
After rejecting the pleas of ESOP fiduciaries for a zone of
immunity from prudence scrutiny of employer stock investments,
the Dudenhoeffer Court expressed sympathy for their plight, and
proceeded to lay out an approach to evaluating fiduciary breach
claims that might in practice cut them some slack.345 The opinion
observed that “ESOP fiduciaries often are company insiders” and
that breach claims frequently allege imprudence “in failing to act on
inside information they have about the value of the employer’s
stock.”346 That concern about conflict between ERISA fiduciary law
and the prohibition of insider trading “is a legitimate one.”347 The
Court also credited the concern that

343. See, e.g., Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271-76 (describing the trustee’s procedural failings);
see also WIEDENBECK , supra note 21, at 129-30.
344. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2463 (2014).
345. See id. at 2468-72.
346. Id. at 2469.
347. Id.

2018]

UNTRUSTWORTHY: ERISA’S ERODED FIDUCIARY LAW

1087

in many cases an ESOP fiduciary who fears that continuing to
invest in company stock may be imprudent finds himself between a rock and a hard place: If he keeps investing and the
stock goes down he may be sued for acting imprudently in
violation of § 1104(a)(1)(B), but if he stops investing and the
stock goes up he may be sued for disobeying the plan documents
in violation of § 1104(a)(1)(D).348

In particular, the Court was persuaded that careful balancing between Congress’s goals of encouraging ESOPs and protecting
employees’ benefits calls for “careful, context-sensitive scrutiny of
a complaint’s allegations” to “weed[ ] out meritless claims.”349
Sketching out that scrutiny, the Court pointed to the motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, as reinforced by Iqbal and
Twombly.350
To state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis
of inside information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an
alternative action that the defendant could have taken that
would have been consistent with the securities laws and that a
prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have
viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.351

Hence, fiduciaries possessed of non-public information revealing
employer stock investments to be imprudent may get a securities
law pass.
One might be excused for thinking that conflict with the securities laws and the more-harm-than-good excuse (a sort of global
prudence assessment) are in the nature of affirmative defenses. Yet
as a matter of initial screening, Dudenhoeffer casts them upon the
plaintiff. And one might suspect that, as a pleading standard in the
hands of district judges, the sufficiency of allegations on these
points is likely to become more demanding over time. A per curiam
opinion issued in the aftermath of Dudenhoeffer will amplify that
tendency. In Amgen Inc. v. Harris, the Court reversed a Ninth
348. Id. at 2470.
349. Id. at 2470-71.
350. Id. at 2471 (first citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); and then citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-63 (2007)).
351. Id. at 2472.
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Circuit decision on the ground that it “failed to properly evaluate
the complaint.”352 The Court insisted that the stockholders (in this
case former employees) should have included “facts and allegations”
relevant to the Fifth Third standard in their complaint.353 Indeed,
in light of the Court’s solicitude for the dangerous waters fiduciaries
must navigate, one might speculate that some sort of qualified
immunity akin to the business judgment rule may yet make an
appearance in ERISA fiduciary law. At minimum, Dudenhoeffer
seems to signal receptiveness to some relaxation of prudence
oversight for insider fiduciaries of public company plans holding
employer stock.354
VI. FORTIFYING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROPERTY
This study’s approach is descriptive. It provides a critical analysis
of doctrinal evolution, but a normative stance has been resolutely
avoided. The emergence of weak property from the confluence of the
plan sponsor’s far-reaching amendment authority, employer-controlled plan interpretation, and implicit exculpation, may be good or
bad from a public policy perspective. That determination turns on
whether current law (that is, weak property) reaches a socially
optimal balance between the interests of sponsoring employers and
employee plan participants.355 That is of course an empirical
question, and possibly an unanswerable one.
Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that the federal courts have
gradually remodeled ERISA’s fiduciary regime into a pliable
employer-friendly system that would startle ERISA’s drafters.356
And many benefit curtailments that have been approved under the
settlor function doctrine, or with the aid of employer-controlled
352. 136 S. Ct. 758, 759 (2016) (per curiam).
353. Id. at 760.
354. One commentator summarized a review of post-Dudenhoeffer lower court decisions
with the observation that “one wonders whether the standard is insurmountable.” Joe Clark,
Courts Close Their Doors to ERISA Stock-Drop Litigation, 44 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 448
(Apr. 4, 2017); accord Jacklyn Wille, Cliffs Natural Resources Beats ERISA Challenge to Stock
Drop, 85 U.S.L.W. No. 38 (Apr. 13, 2017) (quoting Samuel Bonderoff, who claimed that lower
courts have taken language from Dudenhoeffer and Amgen and “extrapolated from it a
pleading standard so biased against plaintiffs that it makes [the prior presumption of prudence approach] look like a day at the beach”).
355. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
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interpretation or implicit exculpation, surely took workers by surprise, imposing hardships that many see as unfair. If enhanced
safeguards for workers’ pensions or welfare benefits are desired,
how could that objective be accomplished?
Legislative amendment could rebalance interests in principle. In
practice, however, congressional action tightening fiduciary obligations is surely a nonstarter, and not simply due to the current
political alignment. ERISA’s fiduciary obligations and civil enforcement mechanism have proven extremely stable over four decades,
even as other parts of the statute were repeatedly amended.
Employer-friendly fiduciary rules affect only one workplace at a
time; impacted workers may be outraged, but they are few. ERISA’s
fiduciary regime is technical. It has low visibility. Hence it has
correspondingly low political salience. Unlike many frequent and
sweeping ERISA amendments, altering the details of fiduciary
oversight would not emerge as a crisis- or revenue-driven legislative
imperative.357
Judicial relief offers some promise, but only at the margins.
Outright reversal of the trend of decisions cannot be realistically
expected. Even a wholesale change in the ideological composition of
the Supreme Court would not at this point overturn its landmark
endorsements of a limited scope of review for benefit denials and
plan interpretations, from which implicit exculpation proceeds. Yet
as Professors Muir and Stein advocated, some of the more troubling
applications of the settlor function doctrine might be avoided by
emphasizing the tension between preserving employer autonomy,
which supports unchecked settlor action, and competing policies
reflected in ERISA’s substantive protections.358

357. For example, ERISA has been repeatedly amended to prevent abuse of the termination
insurance system for defined benefit pensions, and to address the precarious financial condition of the insurer, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See, e.g., Pension Protection
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 101-506, 120 Stat. 780, 784-948; Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 9302-9346, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-333 to
1330-374. For defined contribution plans, the vulnerabilities and excesses revealed in the
wake of Enron’s collapse fueled many changes. See Pension Protection Act §§ 507, 621, 901.
Amendments to control and better target the tax subsidy for qualified retirement savings
have been another recurrent theme. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM . ON TAXATION, 99TH
CONG ., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 624-851 (Comm. Print
1987).
358. See Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 541-43.
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Executive action seems to offer the most practicable path to
change under existing conditions. Much might be accomplished by
rulemaking. The Labor Department’s longstanding proclivity to
proceed by litigation—in particular, intervening in private civil
enforcement suits by filing amicus briefs in the courts of appeals359—is slow, uncertain, and dependent on the priorities of
private parties. The Labor Department recently engaged in an
eight-year-long battle with the financial services industry to promulgate a regulation expanding the definition of fiduciary.360 At first
blush that experience counsels against optimism over rulemaking’s
efficacy in this context.
The fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule is a legislative regulation
that was produced through two rounds of notice and comment and
was informed by extensive industry input. Despite intense industry
opposition, the rule was finalized and has largely taken effect,
although efforts aimed at a legislative override continue.361 The
latter point is revealing. As the product of public rulemaking
procedures, the rule is subject to a limited scope of judicial review
and (unless found to be arbitrary and capricious362) has the force of
legislation. The rule is binding on the courts. An alternative to this
sometimes lengthy and resource-intensive rulemaking process
might serve almost as well. The Labor Department might simply
issue interpretive rules, which are exempt from required notice and
comment procedures.363 Interpretive rules, of course, are not binding
on the courts.364 Yet they are often persuasive, the more so if they

359. See Amicus Briefs Under ERISA, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/
about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/amicus-briefs [https://perma.cc/YSC4-F82V].
360. See supra note 25.
361. See Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, Another House Bill Targets Fiduciary Rule, Pens. & Ben.
Daily (BNA) No. 132 (July 12, 2017); see also supra note 25.
362. The fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule survived judicial review at the district court
level. See Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 180, 192 (N.D. Tex. 2017),
appeal docketed sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, No. 17-10238 (5th Cir.
Mar. 1, 2017).
363. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012). On the difficulty of defining
an interpretive rule and distinguishing it from a legislative rule that is invalid because it is
issued without required public input, see Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance
Exemption (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 17-0405, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958267 [https://perma.cc/TDE5-RVMD].
364. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02, 302 n.31, 312-16 (1979); see Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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are accompanied by a complete and well-reasoned explanation of the
agency’s reading of the statute. Interpretations that bolster fiduciary protections would promptly be cited by benefit claimants as
authority in ERISA cases nationwide. As such, the Labor Department’s announcement of a coherent uniform interpretation would
give courts handling ERISA civil enforcement litigation a strong
nudge toward developing federal fiduciary law in the direction
charted by the rule. This nudge strategy would induce an army of
plaintiffs’ lawyers to make better-informed and doctrinally consistent arguments before federal district courts nationwide. From the
Labor Department’s perspective, such interpretive rules would function like a uniform amicus brief filed in all cases that present the
relevant issue, at the district court level as well as in the courts of
appeals.
What would new regulations—legislative or interpretive—designed to fortify employee benefit property look like? Each of the
major weaknesses addressed in this Article appears amenable to
strengthening with a well-crafted rule. First, the settlor function
doctrine could be contained by a rule stating that certain acts—particularly investment selection, or in the case of participant-directed
defined contribution plans, the selection of the investment menu—
are inherent (or “core”) fiduciary functions.365 Consequently, plan
terms that mandate specified investments, although formally effected by adoption or amendment of the plan instrument, are the
product of fiduciary action (asset management) and would not be
immunized as plan design decisions.366 This would address the so365. See supra note 100; see also Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465-66 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that appointing fiduciary is a fiduciary act even if accomplished by plan
amendment); Muir & Stein, supra note 44, at 540-41 (suggesting that a plan design decision
might be logically classified as a “fiduciary act if it required a plan official to act in a way that
would be impermissible if the plan official had merely been given broad discretionary authority”).
366. Cf. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (2014) (finding that
obligation to follow plan instructions consistent with ERISA “makes clear that the duty of
prudence trumps the instructions of a plan document, such as an instruction to invest
exclusively in employer stock even if financial goals demand the contrary” (citing ERISA
§ 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012))). The Court did not stop to explain why a
person subject to such a mandatory investment instruction fits within the fiduciary definition.
As explained earlier, at a deeper level Dudenhoeffer offers indirect implicit authority for the
proposition that investment choice is an inherent fiduciary function. See supra text accompanying notes 266-68.
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called “hard-wiring” problem.367 In addition, such a rule might
provide that any action or determination that is not accomplished
by the adoption, amendment, or termination of a benefit plan is per
se not a settlor function. This component of the rule would repudiate
what Muir and Stein labeled the “business decision strand” of the
settlor function doctrine.368 In combination these two elements
would declare the Labor Department’s view that creation or alteration of plan terms is necessary but not sufficient to bring an act
within the ambit of the settlor function doctrine.
With respect to plan interpretation, a new regulation could
authoritatively announce the Labor Department’s position that an
employee benefit plan confers contractual rights, and even when
those rights are hedged with numerous important contingencies (as
most health plans are), benefits are not a gift. Consequently, the
plan sponsor is not a donor and terms of the plan cannot be solely
interpreted to carry out the intent of the sponsor. Although the
employer generally maintains ongoing control over plan terms
under the settlor function doctrine, at any given point in time the
extant provisions of the plan should be interpreted with a view to
the reasonable understanding of the language, not the subjective
purposes of the sponsoring employer.369 For plans that are the
product of collective bargaining, a regulation on plan interpretation
might undertake to better elucidate the “ordinary principles of
contract law” than did the Court in M & G Polymers.370 In particular, the rule might emphasize that the factors considered in M & G
Polymers were selective and case-specific, and should not be understood as laying out a comprehensive set of potentially relevant
contract interpretation precepts. It might also disavow a general
rule that silence on the duration of retiree benefits necessarily rules
out a life-long commitment.371
Turning from the range of application of ERISA’s fiduciary regime
to the intensity of fiduciary oversight, rulemaking (again, legislative
or interpretive) could potentially rein in implicit exculpation. The
Labor Department could issue a regulation endorsing the majority
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
See supra Part IV.A.
See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 936-37 (2015).
See supra Part IV.B.
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analysis in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn that a fiduciary
conflict of interest is a factor that can in some circumstances show
an adverse benefit determination to be an abuse of discretion.372
Such a rule could expressly provide that, while the mere presence
of a conflict does not invalidate the result, if consideration of all the
facts surrounding the decision reveals a significant risk that the
conflict might have tainted the outcome, then the determination
involves an abuse of discretion.373 In issuing such a rule, the Labor
Department would emphasize that: (1) Conkright v. Frommert374 did
not overturn Glenn; and (2) ERISA’s “exclusive purpose” standard
demands that the right to an unbiased decision be broadly enforced.
That is, Glenn teaches that the claimant should prevail in cases of
causal uncertainty, not just in unusual situations presenting strong
evidence that a conflict actually infected the decision.
CONCLUSION
ERISA fiduciary law, which Congress left largely to informed
elaboration by the federal courts, has been dramatically transformed by a series of uncoordinated low-visibility judicial decisions
on multiple fronts. These apparently unconnected case law developments, when gathered together to expose and compare their
unstated implications, reveal a startling pattern of mutually reinforcing restrictions on ERISA’s protection of pension and welfare
benefits. The least dangerous branch375 has defanged—some would
say deranged—ERISA’s fiduciary regime.
This Article has catalogued, integrated, and systematized doctrinal developments in ERISA fiduciary law. Several important conclusions emerge from the analysis. Many of the pathologies of the
settlor function doctrine, so ably documented by Professors Muir and
Stein, are shown to be attributable to ERISA’s minimal limits on
the plan sponsor’s ongoing amendment authority, and particularly
372. See 554 U.S. 105, 115-17 (2008).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 290-310.
374. 559 U.S. 506 (2010).
375. See THE FEDERALIST NO . 78, at 464, 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“[F]irmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity
and confining the operation of [unjust and partial laws]” that injure “the private rights of
particular classes of citizens”).
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the accrued benefit anti-reduction rule. Muir and Stein demonstrated how the settlor function doctrine curtails the range of
application of ERISA’s fiduciary regime, but this study makes the
case that both the scope and the intensity of fiduciary oversight are
subject to interpretation or judicial manipulation. Juxtaposition and
careful comparison of the Supreme Court’s opinions applying the
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to plan interpretations issued
by fiduciaries acting under a conflict of interest demonstrate that
the appointment of a company insider as fiduciary works a practical
relaxation of the exclusive benefit rule (ERISA’s duty of loyalty),
and therefore amounts to a de facto or implicit exculpatory provision.376 That implicit exculpation reduces the intensity of judicial
review of employer-inflected decisions (benefit claim denials and
employer-friendly plan interpretations). Hence, the courts have
reined in both the breadth of application (via the settlor-function
doctrine) and the stringency of ERISA fiduciary law.
Interestingly, the implicit exculpation phenomenon can also be
understood as a sort of backhanded vindication of the famous proposal (or prediction) made by Professors Fischel and Langbein: in
practice, ERISA’s fundamental contradiction, the exclusive benefit
rule, is actually modulated to take into account the employer’s
interests in a benefit program. Unfortunately, however, the process
is not transparent. The courts accept employer-regarding determinations under the rubrics of limited review and deference, rather
than forthrightly acknowledging the interest balancing that seems
to be going on behind the scenes.
In the common case of an employer-instituted plan that is not the
product of bargaining with workers, the settlor function doctrine
cedes unilateral control over a plan’s terms to the employer. That
control is expanded and amplified by the judicial penchant to view
the employer as a donor. So viewed, the author of the conditional
wealth transfer becomes the only party whose objectives matter in
the interpretation of plan terms, because the courts’ mission is to
carry out the employer-cum-donor’s intent. In combination, the
settlor function doctrine, employer interpretive dominance, and
implicit exculpation have slowly transformed ERISA fiduciary law,

376. See supra Part V.B.1.
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revealing a worker’s “property” in employee benefits to be quite
fragile and weak.
This evolution makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that the
federal courts have worked a silent revolution in ERISA’s fiduciary
regime. The unnoticed case law coup has hollowed out Congress’s
vaunted protective policy, and largely remade ERISA in the image
of private trust law. For employer-instituted plans, ERISA fiduciary
law has become a default system of legal relations that can be
molded to serve the will of one party, the employer, whose objectives
are respected as proxy for the common good.377
This assessment may seem unduly harsh, even paranoid. Yet the
erosion of ERISA fiduciary law chronicled here has been accompanied by curtailment of ERISA’s contract dimension.378 Those simultaneous retreats lend credence to labor’s lament. Arguably,
workers’ interests in pension and welfare benefit plans would be
best served by development of a robust understanding of the
377. Cf. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri’s Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine—New View of the
Policy Against Perpetuities?, 50 MO . L. REV. 805, 831-33 (1985) (suggesting that a settlor’s
dead-hand control over the dispositive terms of a private trust may be tolerated, not to
enhance incentives for productive members of society to accumulate property, but as an
affordable surrogate for promoting the welfare of living beneficiaries, with whose needs and
capacities the settlor is presumed to have been personally acquainted).
378. This Article tells only one part of the story of how ERISA lost its way—or was led
astray. ERISA, in its origin, blended two legal personalities, trust and contract. While the
apparently revolutionary trust law aspect of ERISA was being domesticated, it was also
elevated to rhetorical prominence. Simultaneously, the contract component of employee
benefit plans underwent transformation by the federal courts. ERISA’s trust law turn was
accompanied by a corresponding de-emphasis and distortion of the contract dimension. Over
time, the definition of the benefit commitment shifted: instead of enforcing the deal as
workers are given to understand it, courts now privilege as contract the employer-controlled
formal plan document.
Just as it initiated ERISA’s trust law turn, supra note 282 and accompanying text,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), was the turning point in the
erosion of the contract component of benefit plans. Firestone grounded the scope of review of
plan interpretations on a “nonsense reading” of trust law rather than on well-established and
less-manipulable contract principles. See Langbein, supra note 283, at 208-09. The decisive
step was taken by CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 436-38 (2011), which refused to treat
the summary plan description—a communication mandated by Congress to facilitate workers’
career and financial planning by providing them with accessible, understandable, and actionable information about the major features of the benefit program—as setting the core terms
of the deal. Instead, the Court unanimously announced that “the summary documents, important as they are, provide communication with beneficiaries about the plan, but ... their
statements do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan for purposes of § 502(a)(1)(B).”
Id. at 438.
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employer’s promissory obligation.379 Strong contract might be
preferable to weak property. As matters now stand, however, joint
degradation is the order of the day: ERISA defines and defends
workers’ interests in pension and welfare benefits through a combination of weak property and weak contract.

379. A framework that would accord priority to promises made in the SPD, allow the plan
document to control on less salient technical matters, and obligate workers to take reasonable
steps to inform themselves, is set out in some detail in WIEDENBECK , supra note 21, at 65-93,
107-08. That approach—which was designed to encourage optimal disclosure based on careful
consideration of the materiality of information to plan participants—would prudently balance
ERISA’s competing policies. Cigna Corp. forecloses direct prioritization of the SPD. See Cigna
Corp., 563 U.S. at 438. Nevertheless, optimal disclosure to promote economic efficiency (improved worker career and financial planning) might still be attainable by other means. Peter
J. Wiedenbeck, Refining Mandatory Disclosure: Statement Presented to the ERISA Advisory
Council, June 6, 2017 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 17-06-01, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982433 [https://
perma.cc/F745-BYV3].

